Comments:
Revised Proposed Plan Test Area North
at the
Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Laboratory

Submitted by

Chuck Broscious

On behalf of the Environmental Defense Institute

December 1998

The Department of Energy's (DOE) Revised Proposed Plan for Waste Area Group 1 - Test Area North (TAN) dated November 1998 contains a few important changes that are a result of the Environmental Defense Institute's review of the February 1998 initial plan that showed significant non-compliance with applicable statutes. The State of Idaho and Environmental Protection Agency regulators must be acknowledged for taking the steps within their regulatory authority to force DOE to revisit the initial TAN plan.

Unfortunately, the TAN plan still fails to provide remedial solutions that meet Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements (ARAR). The Plan offers no substantive information about the maximum contamination levels related to individual Operational Units (OU). Consequently, the general public is effectively denied essential information upon which to make their own determination of whether the preferred alternatives were appropriate.

The Plan claims to be "the comprehensive" CERCLA investigation into TAN. This is not a "comprehensive" Plan because the ANP Cask Storage Pad, the Area 10 HTRE Reactor Vessel Burial Site, and the TAN Pool have been excluded.

The Heat Transfer Reactor Experiment (HTRE) was part of the 1960's Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion - Initial Engine Test - program. The underground reactor storage unit (near the TAN Turntable) was intended as a shielded temporary storage unit to put reactors and its shield plugs between test runs. The storage unit is a ten foot tank buried vertically with the top end cut out at the ground surface. The reactor vessel and shield plug (10 feet in length) were accidentally dropped into the tank via failed crane rigging and the vessel wedged in the tank making extraction difficult. So the HTRE was simply left in the storage unit and DOE is prepared to leave it there for ever despite the fact that it violates waste disposal regulations. In addition to the highly radioactive reactor vessel (Cs-137, Co-60, Sr-90 contaminants) , shield plugs of the HTRE's were filled with mercury which would also violate RCRA hazardous waste disposal regulations. According to the Remedial Investigation/ Feasibility Study (RI/FS) "Soils below and around the reactor vessel storage units have not been sampled making a estimate about the nature and extent of contamination at the site difficult." [DOE/ID-10557@4-59] The HTRE reactor vessel is less than two feet of the surface which creates a long term hazard from exposure and the storage tank is already forty years old making any containment problematic.

The contamination the TAN Plan addresses is mixed hazardous / radioactive low-level waste (MLLW) and is listed in DOE's own Site Treatment Plan (STP) which the Department was required to generate to comply with the Federal Facilities Compliance Act. This MLLW designation is supported by the TAN Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) sample data that clearly shows Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) extraction analysis results exceeding the regulatory limit in 40 CFR ss 268.48. Therefore RCRA Land Disposal Restrictions (LDR) in 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 148 and Parts 268 for MLLW and Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10 CFR-Subpart D ss 61.50 must be applied. Unfortunately, the State of Idaho Division of Environmental Quality (DEQ) and the Environmental Protection Agency as regulators refuse to force DOE to comply with the legal requirements of the most basic of environmental laws. The Plan proposes disposal of this MLLW in a manner that would not even comply with municipal garbage landfill requirements let alone the more stringent MLLW regulations. For those TAN hazardous waste release sites, the LDR's in 40 CFR 148 & 268 still apply.

DOE does commit to excavation of two soil contaminated sites. However, DOE's statement of "on-site disposal at an approved repository" offers little assurance that DOE will meet regulatory requirements. At those two Operable Units, the agency is not specifically committing to disposal in a RCRA compliant Subtitle C MLLW dump. Admittedly, DOE is considering constructing a MLLW RCRA compliant dump at the INEEL Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) for ICPP waste however, there is no indication that the TAN MLLW will be interned there. Questions about the ICPP MLLW dump being in a 100/500 year flood plain have yet to be resolved. The Environmental Defense Institute advocates for the construction of a RCRA Subtitle C dump not in any flood plains and off the Snake River Plain Aquifer. See EDI comments on ICPP Proposed Plan. Dumping radioactive and chemical waste in unlined shallow pits and trenches over top of the regions sole source Snake River Plain Aquifer must end. This misguided dumping practice at the INEEL Radioactive Waste Management Complex Subsurface Disposal Area has resulted in extensive contamination of the aquifer. Absent a definitive commitment to do otherwise, the proposed TAN Plan intends to repeat this dumping practice despite undeniable examples of failure of this approach. DOE has already gotten away with this illegal dumping in the Test Reactor Area Warm Waste Pond Environmental Restoration project completed in 1997. The Department proposes to repeat this type of dumping at the Naval Reactor Facility, Argonne-West and again at Test Area North.

DOE new plan for the TAN PM-2A waste tanks is "removal and treatment of the tank contents" which is an improvement to their earlier plan. The problem is that the "treatment" and disposal of the "treated" waste is not specified. In previous plans this treatment meant mixing the waste with cement (grout) and dumping it back in shallow pits at the INEEL. This is another lesson NOT learned at INEEL is the public and regulators rejection of grouting of MLLW and shallow land burial at Hanford. EDI proposes that the Hanford model be used and the waste vitrified and stored on site until a permanent geologic repository is developed.

Below Table A lists the Operable Units (contaminate release sites) and the proposed decisions remedial actions or no actions. Table B lists the Operable Units and selected sampling data and the source of the data. This information is the result of months of review of the voluminous Administrative Record. The Environmental Defense Institute believes that this information is essential to making an informed decision as to whether DOE's preferred alternative is appropriate. Regulators should have insisted that this information be included in the Plan that was mailed out to the general public.

DOE has never in any of its INEEL Environmental Restoration Record of Decisions (ROD) been forced by the regulators to specify what institutional control constitutes. Only through that legally binding ROD document can DOE be held liable for specific actions. For instance, 100 years of institutional control (the amount DOE has committed to) could be interpreted as retaining ownership and annual flybys to monitor the site. In view of the toxicity of the waste being hazardous for hundreds of thousands of years, this is a crucial issue. The length of time the waste will pose a risk to any intruder must determine the duration of institutional control and barriers adequate to keep intruders out must be maintained for the duration. Monitoring must include soil and ground water sampling to ensure the waste is not migrating. A trust fund must also be established so that if the federal government again decides to ignore the law, that state or local government will have the resources to do the job.

The preferred alternative for the V Tanks (TAN -09) is insitu vitrification (ISV). EDI believes that the National Environmental Policy Act applies because it is a major federal action with potential for significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. $10,471,864 = major action. The potential for releases that could affect the environment have plagued this technology as seen with explosions at DOE's Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Hanford, and INEEL. With fissile material the issue of criticality potential must also be addressed. DOE offers no disclosure of emission control systems (gas and particulate) or the required hazard category two or greater that requires double containment and impact capability currently not included in the ISV plan. DOE has not identified the acceptable risk range for short-term risk to workers and public currently not included in the ISV plan. The old adage that "the devil is in the details" applies here. DOE has no public credibility to develop the "details" behind closed doors because that process lead to the massive INEEL contamination and a $19-29 billion superfund cleanup legacy.

DOE Guidelines to NEPA compliance (10 CFR 1021 Appendix B Subpart D) and the Categorical Exclusions (CE) (B(2) & B(3)) prohibit use of CE's for waste treatment facilities. Categorical Exclusions can not be used when the project "requires siting and construction or major expansion of waste storage, disposal, recovery, or treatment facilities (including incinerators and facilities for treating wastewater, surface water and groundwater water or disturb hazardous substances, pollutants, contaminants." Therefore, if DOE proceeds with the ISV, it must meet NEPA requirements.

DOE must meet RCRA Land Disposal Restriction (LDR) Universal Treatment Requirements or dispose of waste in RCRA compliant Subtitle C 42 USC 6924 (B) (1)(A)(i) construction requirements Idaho Hazardous Waste Management Act also applies to closure of RCRA storage units. The V tanks and the PM tanks fit in this storage class. IDAPA 16.01.05. and they are also listed in the INEEL Site Treatment Plan as MLLW.

ISV is not an approved treatment in RCRA Land Disposal Restrictions (40 CFR 268.40)

Treatment Standards for Hazardous Wastes. V-1, 2, & 3 tanks have 22 RCRA listed wastes in excess of the Universal Treatment Standards (268.48). V-9 tank has 26 RCRA listed wastes in excess of the Universal Treatment Standards (UTS). DOE is obliged to show how ISV will meet the treatment standards for each and everyone of the contaminates exceeding the UTS.

For example: Mercury, and Aroclor (a PCB) require incineration or retort. DOE must show how ISV meets treatment requirement for exemption from RCRA Subtitle C MLLW disposal

DOE must test in-situ post melt and have a contingency plan if the insitu vitrification does not meet RCRA Universal Treatment Standards.

How is DOE meeting NRC licence requirements for permanent disposal site under 10 CFR 61.50 Subpart D Technical Requirements for Land Disposal Facilities and 10CFR 61.52 Class C LLW which requires 5 meter (~16.4 ft) cover or 500 year barrier and buffer zone 10 CFR 61.59 Institutional controls can not be relied upon for more than 100 years.

Table A

Site Alternative # Comments

Low-level Rad Contaminated Soils    
TAN Injection Well TSF-05   Pump and treat implemented

STP says liquid/sludge is MLLW

Turntable TSF-06 Area B 3a DOE proposes Excavate soil and onsite disposal

Waste Qualifies as MLLW

TSF-06 Contaminated Soil 1 DOE proposes removal action

(institutional control)

Waste qualifies as MLLW

Tan Disposal Pond (TSF-07) 1 DOE proposes no removal action

STP says contaminated soil is MLLW.

WRRTF Burn Pits WRRTF-01 1 DOE proposes no removal action and soil cover

qualifies as hazardous waste

Mercury Spill Area TSF-08 3 DOE proposes excavation soil and

off site disposal

Qualifies as hazardous waste

Diesel Fuel Leak WRRTF-13 1 DOE proposes removal action and soil cover

Qualifies as hazardous waste

Disposal Pond Loft-02 0 DOE proposes no action

Waste qualifies as MLLW

Drainage Pool TSF-10 o DOE proposes no action

Waste qualifies as MLLW

Tanks    
V-Tanks TSF-09/18

V-1, 2, and 3 are 10,000 gallon tanks

V-9 (TSF-18) is a 400 gallon tank

Tanks are ~ 10 deep

4 DOE proposes In-situ vitrification (alternative 4)

if fails (high VOC likely explode)

STP says liquid/sludge MLLW

Contents and soils of V tanks qualify as MLLW

V-2 tank liquid spill (1,700 gal)

IET Valve Pit TSF-21 o DOE proposes No action

STP says contaminated soil is MLLW

page 6-3

PM-2A Tanks TSF-26

V-13 and V-14

4a DOE proposes soil excavation on-site disposal and In-situ grouting of tank contents

STP says debris/sludge is MLLW

STP = INEEL Site Treatment Plan: a compliance document for Federal Facility Compliance Act

Ignored sites: ANP Cask Storage Pad; Area 10 Reactor Vessel Burial Site

TAN Pool contaminated soil , TAN-616

Table B

TAN Site Contaminate Concentration Reference
ANP Cask Storage Pad Gross Alpha 330 pCi/g (a) Table A-5-5
  Gross Beta 25,600 pCi/g "
  Cs-137 30,400 pCi/g "
TSF-3 Burn Pit      
  Lead 2,830 mg/kg (a) Likely exceeds LDR TCLP for lead

0.37 mg/l

(a) Table A-2-3

TSF-06 Turn Table

Contaminated Soil

Cs-137

Gross Beta

30,400 pCi/g

1,880 pCi/g

(a)4-24

(a) Table A-5-7

  Mercury

Lead

80,500 mg/kg

50.4

Exceeds LDR TCLP for mercury at

0.025 mg/l

Lead 0.37 mg/l

(a) Table A-5-6

TSF-07

TAN Disposal Pond

Sight Treatment Plan lists as MLLW STP @ 6-3
  aluminum 25,400 mg/kg (a)4-29
  Chromium

Lead

Selenium

257 mg/kg

210

42

Likely exceeds LDR TCLP for Lead @ 0.37

Selenium @ 0.16

(b) 4-110

  mercury

barium

4,040 mg/kg

9,740

Exceeds LDR TCLP mercury at 0.025 mg/l

Barium at 7.6 mg/l

(b) 4-110

  sulfide 4,270 mg/kg (b) 4-110
  Cobalt-60 87.7 pCi/g (b) 4-110
  Cesium-137 135 pCi/g (b)4-110
Drainage Pool (TSF-10) aluminum 30,400 mg/kg (a)4-26
V-1 Tank Liquid

(TSF-09/18)

STP Lists Liquid and Sludge MLLW STP @ 6-3
  Cobalt-60 101,000 pCi/l (a) Table A-6-10
  Cs-134 16,900 pCi/l (a) Table A-6-10
  Cs-137 12,500,000 pCi/l (a) Table A-6-10
  Europium-152 83,800 pCi/l (a) Table A-6-10
  Europium-154 93,800 pCi/l (a) Table A-6-10
  Plutonium-238 7,010 pCi/l (a) Table A-6-10
  Plutonium-239 3,220 pCi/l (a) Table A-6-10
  Americium-241 8,680 pCi/l (a) Table A-6-10
  Gross Beta 16,100,000 pCi/l (c) 59
  Gross Gamma 24,300,000 pCi/l (c)59
  Gross Alpha 19,800 pCi/l (c) 59
  Tritium 11,800,000 pCi/l (a) Table A-6-10
  Total Strontium 1,840,000 pCi/l (a) Table A-6-10
  Mercury

Barium

Cadmium

Chromium

Lead

Silver

0.842 mg/l

2,320 mg/kg

330

286

81.7

18

Likely Exceeds UTS mercury @ 0.15 mg/l

barium @ 7.6 mg/l

Cadmium @ .19

Lead @ .37

Silver @ .30

(a) Table A-6-10 & 11

  Tetrachloroethene

Trichloroethene

1,800 mg/kg

23

Exceed LDR UTS

(a) Table A-6-11



Vinyl Chloride

1,1 Dichloroethene

Chloroform

1,2 dichloroethene

Carbontetrachloride

Benzene

Chlorobenzene

  All Exceed LDR UTS

(c) 8 through 12

Tank V-2

TSF-09/18

STP Lists Liquid and Sludge MLLW STP @ 6-3
  Cobalt-60 10,500 pCi/l (a) A-6-10
  Cesium-137 20,200,000 pCi/l (a) A-6-10
  Strontium-90 1,450,000 pCi/l (a) A-6-10
  Gross Beta 23,400,000 pCi/l (a) A-6-10
  Gross Gamma 38,500,000 pCi/l (c)59
  Gross Alpha 84.9 pCi/l (c) 59


Trichloroethene

Tetrachloroethene

Cadmium

Vinyl Chloride

All four chemicals/metals

Exceed TCLP

(c) 8 through 12
  1,2-Dichloroethane

Carbon tetrachloride

Benzene

All three chemicals at the TCLP level (c) 8 through 12
  18 Hazardous Chemicals Exceed Universal Treatment Standards (b) 10-44

40 CFR 268.48

V-3 Tank (TSF-09/18) STP lists MLLW STP @ 6-3
  Uranium-233/234 13,300 pCi/l (b) A-83
  Strontium-90 12,300,000 pCi/l "
  Cobalt-60 14,800 pCi/l "
  Cesium-137 4,230,000 pCi/l "
  Ruthenium-103 13,600 pCi/l "
  Tritium 6,090,000 pCi/l "
  Nickel-63 205,000 pCi/l "
  Gross Beta 28,300,000 pCi/l (c) 59
  Gross Gamma 2,230,000 pCi/l (c) 59


Trichloroethene

Tetrachloroethene

Vinyl Chloride

All three chemicals/metals

Exceed TCLP

(c) 8 through 12
  1,2-Dichloroethane

Carbon tetrachloride

Benzene

All three chemicals at the TCLP level (c) 8 through 12
  18 Hazardous Chemicals Exceed LDR Universal Treatment Standards (b) 10-44

40 CFR 268.48

V-9 Tank (TSF-09/18) STP Lists Liquid and Sludge MLLW STP @ 6-3
  Americium-241 40,200 pCi/l (b) A-91
  Plutonium-238 170,000 pCi/l (b) A-91
  Plutonium-239/240 45,300 pCi/l (b) A-91
  Uranium-233 12,400 pCi/l (b) A-91
  Uranium-234 211,000 pCi/l (b) A-91
  Uranium-235 6,900 pCi/l (b) A-91
  Uranium-236 3,260 pCi/l (b) A-91
  Uranium-238 972 pCi/l (b) A-91
  Cesium-137 6,370,000 pC/g (b) A-91
  Tritium 353,000,000 pCi/l (b) A-91
  Total Strontium 250,000,000 pCi/l (b) A-91
  Cerium-244 5,210 pCi/l (b) A-91
  Cobalt-60 1,160,000 pCi/l (b) A-91
  26 hazardous

chemicals/metals

Exceed UTS Treatment

Standards

(b) 10-44

40 CFR 268.48

PM-2A TSF-26

V-13 Tank

50,000 gallon

tank

STP lists Liquids and Sludge as MLLW STP @ 6-3
  Cobalt-60 45,900,000 pCi/l (c) 10-31
  Europium-154 93,000,000 pCi/l (C)10-31
  Cesium-137 2,900,000,000 pCi/l (c) 10-31
  Strontium-90 2,850,000,000 pCi/l (c) 10-31
  Cesium-134 18,100,000 pCi/l (c) 10-31
  31 Hazardous Chemicals/metals Exceed UTS Treatment Standards (b) 10-28 to 31

40 CFR 268.48

PMA-2M TSF-26

V-14 Tank

50,000 Gallon Tank TSP Lists Liquid and Sludge as MLLW STP @ 6-3
  Cobalt-60 191,000,000 pCi/l (c) 31
  Cesium-134 2,000,000 pCi/l (C) 31
  Cesium-137 9,420,000,000 pCi/l (c) 31
  Europium-154 17,200,000 pCi/l (c) 31
  Strontium-90 9,260,000,000 pCi/l (c) 31
  33 hazardous chemicals/metals Exceed UTS Treatment Standards (b) 10-28 to 31

40 CFR 268.48

V Tank soil STP lists as MLLW 54,120 pCi/g RE-P-80-090 @6
       
IET Valve Pit

TSF-21

STP lists MLLW STP @ 6-3
  Cs-137 602,000 pCi/l (a)Table A-9-2
  Lead

Five other inorganic

likely exceed UTS

9,350 ug/l Exceeds UTS of

0.69 mg/l

(a) Table A-9-2

  Trichloroethene

Seven other organic

exceed UTS

22,000 ug/l Exceeds UTS of

0.054 mg/l

(a)Table A-9-2

Loft-02

Disposal Pond

aluminum

beryllium

vanadium

23,900 mg/kg Likely exceed LDR

UTS standards

(b) 7-43

  manganese 1,080 mg/kg "
  gross alpha 8,400 pCi/kg

8.4 pCi/g

"
  gross beta 6,500 pCi/kg

6.5 pCi/g

"
WRRTF-01 Burn Pit Xylene 6.600 mg/kg (a) Table A-3-3
  Acetone 4.200 mg/kg (a) Table A-3-5
  Naphthalene 7.800 mg/kg Likely exceeds UTS of

5.6 mg/kg

(a) Table A-3-5

  2-methylnapthalene 10.300 mg/kg Likely exceeds UTS at

5.6 mg/kg

(a) Table A-3-5

  Lead

Mercury

2,350 mg/kg

18 mg/kg

Likely Exceeds LDR TCLP for lead at

0.37 mg/l

mercury @ .025 mg/l

(a) Table A-3-6

Diesel Fuel Tank WRRTF-13 TPH 35,700 mg/kg Likely exceeds UTS for

TPH

(b) 4-140

Acronyms:

LDR = Land Disposal Restrictions (40 CFR 148 through 271)

TCLP = Toxicity Characteristic Leachate Procedure (40 CFR 148 through 271)

UTS = Universal Treatment Standards (40 CFR 148 through 271)

PRG = Preliminary Remediation Goals (EPA cleanup goals based on risk values 12/18/96)

 

References: In the table above, a letter in (parenthesis) refers to the corresponding letter below.

(a); Work Plan for Waste Area Group 1, Operable Unit 1-10, Comprehensive Remedial Investigation / Feasibility Study, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, US Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office, DOE-ID-10527, March 1996.

(b); Comprehensive Remedial Investigation / Feasibility Study for the Test Area North Operable Unit 1-10, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, US Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office, DOE-ID-10557, November 1997.

(c); Field Sampling Plan for Operable Unit 1-10: Test Area North, D. L. Michael, Lockheed Idaho Technologies Company, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, March 1996

(STP); Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Proposed Site Treatment Plan, March 1995, DOE/ID-10493, U.S. Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office.

Plan; Proposed Plan for Waste Area Group 1 - Test Area North, Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, November 1998, INEEL Environmental Restoration Program.

Department of Energy Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs Environmental Impact Statement, April 1995, DOE/EIS-0203-F

Federal Register, May 26, 1998, Part II, Environmental Protection Agency, 40 CFR Parts 148 to 271, Land Disposal Restrictions Phase IV Final Rule