Clean
Air Act Violations at the
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory
Written
for
Environmental Defense Institute
and
Keep Yellowstone Nuclear Free
By
David McCoy and Chuck Broscious
January
17, 2001
I. Climate of Non-Enforcement Breeds Violations
This report focuses on the “hands-off” regulatory climate at the Department of Energy (DOE) Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) waste treatment operations. The consequence of this regulatory vacuum is that there is nearly non-existent enforcement of environmental laws on the most dangerous and hazardous operations in the world – treating high-level radioactive waste. Non-enforcement of environmental laws in this context means no federally mandated hazardous waste permits that otherwise would impose operating, pollution, and reporting criteria to ensure ongoing compliance with all applicable laws. Out of sheer desperation the Environmental Defense Institute and Keep Yellowstone Nuclear Free, as public interest organizations, are forced to take these egregious violations to court in order to force the federal government to comply with its own environmental laws. The scope of this report is limited to the last decade of mixed hazardous and radioactive waste treatment operations at the INEEL.
The largest contributors to air pollution from mixed hazardous chemical
and high-level radioactive waste treatment operations at the Idaho Chemical
Processing Plant (ICPP) include (but are not limited to) the New Waste
Calciner Facility (ACalciner@),
the High-level Liquid Waste Evaporator, the Process Equipment Waste
Evaporator, and the Liquid Effluent Treatment and Disposal Evaporator.
This report focuses primarily on these operations because they generate
the vast majority of pollution emissions to the atmosphere.
The Environmental Defense Institute, Keep Yellowstone Nuclear Free, and David McCoy (Plaintiffs) filed a Notice of Intent to Sue DOE, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the State of Idaho over the Calciner operation that resulted in a temporary stand down of the Calciner incinerator pending an INEEL High-level Waste Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) finding. One of the EIS preferred alternatives is to restart the Calciner and continue to convert the Tank Farm high-level waste into a solid. Given this likelihood of the Calciner restart, this report discusses the regulatory problems with the Calciner. A separate pending EIS may also find INEEL the best site to resume reactor spent nuclear fuel reprocessing for plutonium production that DOE claims is needed for the space program. This means existing non-compliant waste treatment operations will continue to be utilized if this plutonium production mission lands at INEEL.
None of these above mentioned ICPP operations has ever been permitted under federal hazardous waste treatment statutes primarily because none can comply with the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), Clean Air Act (CAA), Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), or the Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) standards for federal hazardous waste treatment, and yet the State of Idaho, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) failed to force compliance or closure of these extremely dangerous operations. The regulators allowed DOE to continue operations under Ainterim status@ that this report will show expired a decade ago. Given this laisse-faire attitude by the regulators, DOE has no incentive to comply with the law. To put this into perspective, common municipal garbage incinerators receive extensive regulatory oversight to insure prescribed operational compliance, yet INEEL waste treatment operations of the most hazardous materials known to human kind (in the same category as nerve gas) receive next to no enforcement of environmental law.
In another Notice of Intent to Sue by the same Plaintiffs (EDI, KYNF,
and McCoy) forced DOE to
permanently shut
down the Waste Experimental Reduction Facility (WERF) mixed
hazardous and radioactive waste incinerator because of non-compliance with
environmental laws. The APlaintiffs@
also filed a formal legal request to EPA and DOE=s
Inspector Generals on August 8, 2000 requesting an investigation of the State
of Idaho Department of Environmental Quality and EPA Region X and the
Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office concerning violations of RCRA,
TSAC and CAA permitting procedures at INEEL.
As of this writing neither agency has responded to this request.
This report offers a limited discussion on the issue of non-enforcement and non-compliance of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. ss 7604), and the Toxic Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C. ss 2605). Discussion focus on the New Waste Calciner Facility (Calciner) and other mixed hazardous high-level radioactive waste treatment plants are offered here as examples of broader fundamental non-compliance problems at INEEL. DOEs ability, as a federal agency, to violate these environmental laws with impunity, literally removes the general public's only protection against non-consensual harm short of litigation, which only occurs after the harm has already been inflicted. DOEs egregious release of hazardous chemicals and radioactivity jeopardizes the health and safety of workers and communities living downwind of the INEEL. Additionally, DOE and the regulatory agencies conspired to conceal information from the public that would expose the truth about these illegal operations. Considerable effort was required by the Environmental Defense Institute through Freedom of Information Act and State of Idaho Public Information Requests to compile the documentation for this report. DOE and its contractor representatives meet every quarter to discuss RCRA compliance issues. The public has been blocked from these meetings in violation of the State’s Open Meeting Law (I.C. ss 67-2342) and Federal Advisory Committee Act statutes (5 U.S.C. Appendix II).
Clearly, INEEL is not unique, because at every DOE facility throughout this country a similar scenario exists. For example, a citizen suit against DOE=s Los Alamos National Laboratory convinced the Federal District Court for New Mexico that DOE was falsifying radiation release reports required under the Clean Air Act. Subsequently, the Court issued a Consent Decree that imposed a court supervised independent monitoring program to ensure compliance with the law. [See Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety v. DOE, Consent Decree, Civ. No. 94-1039 M, filed March 25, 1997]
The disclosures in this report must also be heeded by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), which is conducting an INEEL Dose Reconstruction Health Study to determine the radiation dose to affected populations around the INEEL site. Currently, CDC is using DOE’s stack emission reports without questioning the reliability of the data, despite the preponderance of evidence documenting the fact that the INEEL stack emission reports are fictional creations similar to those found at Los Alamos prior to the civil suit.
The Calciner and other high-level waste treatment operations have no RCRA permit, are in violation of the Clean Air Act, NEPA, the APA and have experienced numerous accidents affecting human health and the environment. EPA, the State Department of Environmental Quality (Department) and DOE have failed to exert proper administrative controls over the Calciner and evaporator facilities, including, but not limited to: failure to establish operating parameters; failure to comply with permit requirements; operating an unpermitted hazardous waste facility; failing to adequately monitor; failing to report violations; allowing an unpermitted facility to discharge radioactive and hazardous waste pollutants into the atmosphere and environment; operation of the Calciner and evaporators beyond design criteria; and conversion of the Calciner to a plutonium incinerator without adherence to NEPA. For these reasons the operation of the Calciner and high-level mixed waste evaporators are an imminent and substantial endangerment to human health and must be immediately terminated.
This report is a compilation of analysis= generated jointly and separately by David McCoy and Chuck Broscious for the Environmental Defense Institute and Keep Yellowstone Nuclear Free. For more information on this subject, including a more detailed analysis of ICPP high-level radioactive waste permit violations, request a copy of ICPP Emissions Report or see EDI’s website at; http://home.earthlink.net/~edinst/
II. Violations of the Clean Air Act
The operation of the New Waste Calcine Facility (“Calciner”) without a RCRA permit is a failure of the EPA, Department and DOE to exert administrative controls over the Calciner and to comply with all Federal and State requirements for a hazardous waste facility, which engages in activities, which has resulted in or may result in the discharge of radioactive and other hazardous air pollutants. 42 U.S.C.' 7418 (Control of Pollution from Federal Facilities) provides in pertinent part as follows:
A(a) General compliance. Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction over any property or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the discharge of air pollutants, and each officer, agent, or employee thereof, shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of air pollution in the same manner, and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity. The preceding sentence shall apply (a) to any requirement whether substantive or procedural (including any record keeping or reporting requirement, any requirement respecting permits and any other requirement whatsoever)...@
The Calciner fails to comply with National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants - Radionuclides (NESHAP) from DOE facilities set forth at 40 C.F.R. ' 61.90-61.97. The Calciner uses two stacks to vent emissions. One stack is the (CPP-659-33 HVAC) stack and the other is the common INTEC Main Stack (CPP-708). The 1998 INEEL NESHAP Annual Report required by 40 CFR 61.94(b) states: AParticulate emissions from the calcining off-gas are continuously monitored through the main stack... Emissions from the New Waste Calcining Facility processing cells are continuously compliance monitored on the (CPP-659-33) HVAC stack." (p. 7-8). If particulate emissions go out the HVAC stack then those emissions would not be detected. There is no data provided that support particulate emission data being continuously monitored at both stacks. Prior to 1997, the HVAC stack was not continuously monitored despite legal requirements. [88NESHAP@12].
The Calciner HVAC stack is only continuously monitored for Americium-241, Cesium-137, and Plutonium- 239. The Main Stack is continuously monitored for eleven nuclides, however neither stack is monitored for gross alpha or gross beta/gamma. Iodine-129 and tritium are only "estimated based on process knowledge." There is an apparent violation of reporting requirements submitted for the Main Stack that are not provided for the HVAC Stack.
There are no descriptions in the INEEL NESHAP Report of the actual monitoring instruments and how they operate, calibrating frequency, or any methodology on emission data collection or quality assurance process. There is no definition of what "continuous monitoring" means. Does it mean real time or does it mean periodic grab samples. If periodic grab sampling is used, is it once a hour/day/month or year? There is no discussion of the DOE admission in the High-level Waste EIS (p. 2-2) with respect to Atechnical constraints, which have hindered DOE=s efforts to sample off-gas emissions from the New Waste Calcine Facility.@
During a phone conversation on 8/30/99 between Chuck Broscious of EDI and Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), officials informed Broscious that DOE is not performing continuous real time monitoring at the Calciner, but only taking periodic grab samples in the 10 parts per million (ppm) range. DOE analysis needs to be in the 10 parts per billion (ppb) range. DEQ further alleged that DOE is also not monitoring for particulate emissions, which means that alpha emitters like plutonium, are not monitored. DEQ informed Broscious that the stack environment of the Calciner is so toxic that instruments are destroyed by corrosion very rapidly.
During a March 15, 2000 conference call between Gerry Spence et al. and EPA Deputy Administrator Chuck Finley et al., the question of the April 2, 1992 cesium-137, antimony-125, and ruthenium-106 release, EPAs Jerry Leitch stated that the incident "was not considered a monitored violation of the NESHAPs.@ As previously noted [see Judge Ryan=s Opinion, supra in Andrus v. DOE] this incident contaminated 40 acres of land on and off the Calciner site, and could not credibly be considered a non-violation. This points to systematic monitoring inadequacies that the Department and EPA have yet to require DOE to correct.
The INEEL 1998 NESHAP Report notes: ANew Waste Calciner Facility HVAC Stack (CPP-659-003).... was redesignated as requiring continuous monitoring under 40 CFR 61.93(b) in 1997.@ This constitutes a violation of pre-1997 emission reporting requirements. Given the extreme hazards, which threaten public safety and the environment from operation of the Calciner as a high-level radioactive waste incinerator, this is a significant reporting violation.
The 1998 Report does not mention the numerous INEEL and Calciner incidents in 1998, including the December 22, 1998 incident where six workers were contaminated and then spread the contamination outside of the Calciner facility to other buildings within the INTEC 200 acre compound.
The 1999 INEEL NESHAP Report reviewed by Keep Yellowstone Nuclear Free found gross errors in the calculations for Iodine-129 and tritium (radioactive water). Not only are the monitors turned off (as documented below), but also the DOE air contamination numbers that they do report are not accurate. The basic calculations for those radioactive chemicals were wrong and the estimated doses to the public are also wrong as a result.
III.
DOE Internal Documents Confirm Non-compliance with Clean Air Act
DOE internal documents gained through Freedom of Information Act requests acknowledge that ICPP radioactive Iodine stack monitors were shut off since 1993 in violation of federal Clean Air Act regulations. (40 CFR 61 Subpart H Section 61.94(b)(9))
Iodine-129 is a well-known carcinogen that has a toxic half-life of 16 million years and therefore is a heavily regulated pollutant. State and federal regulators with a legal mandate to oversee Clean Air Act compliance have again demonstrated incompetence, or complicity since it is believed EPA, and Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) have a copy of these reports. DEQ is the state agency authorized to enforce environmental laws.
The DOE reports show that Iodine-129 from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (now called INTEC) main stack constitutes up to 50% of the radiation dose to the public from the entire INEEL site. The Clean Air Act requires that any single contaminant with even the potential of 10% of the dose to the public must be continuously monitored and reported. These annual National Emissions Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) reports require DOE officials and their contractors to sign a ACertification Statement@ which states in part: AI certify under penalty of law that I have personally examined and am familiar with the information submitted herein and based on my inquiry of those individuals immediately responsible for obtaining the information, I believe that the submitted information is true, accurate and complete.@ The following 1996 internal INEL [sic] Notegram on AAir Legacy Issues@ acknowledges turning off air monitors for I-129, since 1993 as well as other permitting and reporting violations.
“IMPLEMENTATION OF REQUIREMENTS: For much of the last 3 years, INEL has chosen to not operate the ICPP Main Stack Iodine-129 monitor based on a Aliteral@ reading of the NESHAPs regulations. (NESHAPs require continuous monitoring of those constituents which represent 10% or more of the potential INEL dose.) I-129 from the ICPP Main Stack represents the single largest actual dose contributor at the INEL (at times, 50% of the site dose). It is our belief (and that of ORNL personnel) that the current monitoring policy for I-129 on the CPP Main Stack is not consistent with the intent of the regulations and represents a significant liability. (Even if defendable in court, it is difficult to explain to the public why it is a good idea to ‘not operate an already installed monitor’ for the largest dose contributor on the INEL.) (Note that the I-129 monitor is now on-line for the startup of the High Level Waste Evaporator, but future intent is to take it off-line again.)” [emphasis in original]
“TEST AREA NORTH (TAN)-SPECIFIC MANUFACTURING CAPABILITY (SMC) [Air]PERMIT
TO CONSTRUCT (PTC): The
TAN-SMC area has two PTC and the TAN-603 Boilers PTC which contain errors and
problem areas. Cognizant of these
errors, the INEL committed (in the Operating Permit Application) to modify
these two PTCs to correct the deficiencies, operational restrictions,
…Because of plans to make these PTC Modifications (making many of the
current applicable requirements obsolete) little additional effort has been
made to confirm implementation of all the requirements.
The Applications to modify these PTCs have not yet been completed or
submitted to the DEQ. Until these
two PTCs are amended by DEQ, INEL liabilities likely continue to exist.”
[DOE would not allow the DEQ to go on site in 1999 to inspect equipment
in use at TAN-629. Exhaust stacks
were also not adequately monitored.
“OPERATING PERMIT APPLICATION: As part of the INEL Air Operating Permit Application, a certification statement was attached attesting to the truth and accuracy of the content. Because of the complexity and magnitude of the document, errors can be found in description and implementation documentation. Because of the subjective nature of the ‘compliance,’ these errors could be construed as attempts to misrepresent the regulator. Potential exists that not all ‘Release Points’ are identified or accounted for in the Application Implications on future operations of these sources (if unaccounted for ) is unknown.”
“PERMITTING:” “It is not uncommon to learn (after the fact) of project scope changes of magnitudes such that submittal information (upon which the final determination is/was made) is not longer true or enveloping. This has occurred on the ICPP Pilot Plants PTC, the FSA Rack Reconfiguration PTC, the CPP-630 bulb crusher Categorical Exclusion, and possibly the internal determination for the Fuel Canning Facility at CPP-603. This could be construed as attempts to mislead the regulator, nullifying the subject PTCs and /or subjecting the facility to fines. The INEL does not appear to have a good mechanism to assure completeness/accuracy in its applications or hold a project to its stated scope.”
“OPERATING PERMIT APPLICATION: As part of the INEL Air Operating Permit Application, a certification statement was attached attesting to the truth and accuracy of the content. Because of the complexity and magnitude of the document, errors can be found in description and implementation documentation. Because of the subjective nature of ‘compliance,’ these errors could be construed as attempts to misrepresent the regulator. Potential exists that not all ‘Release Points’ are identified or accounted for in the Application.”
“NESHAPs RADIOLOGICAL PROGRAM: 40 CFR 61 Subpart H requires the INEL to limit the Annual Effective Dose Equivalent to 10 mrem or less. To do this, each of LMITCO’s 100+ radiological sources must (1) determine actual annual radionuclide emissions per 61.93(a), and (2) satisfy continuous compliance monitoring or periodic confirmatory measurements (PCM) per 61.93(b). The consistency with which this occurs for each of the affected sources at the INEL is poor. As noted by ORNL personnel, the INEL has no way of ensuring a consistent or compliant NESHAPs program with the responsibilities to determine releases and perform PCM spread out among all facilities owners. ORNL recommends consolidation of these responsibilities and activities similar to the manner in which the Environmental Monitoring group functions. Potential exists that not all ‘Radiological Air Release Points’ are identified or accounted for in the Program or the annual Report. [Quality Assurance] QA for the WERF Category I sources has documentation inadequacies. Disagreement with QA personnel has slowed resolution, but path forward is now well defined.” [emphasis added]
“COMPLIANCE RECORDS:” “It
is highly unlikely that all ‘Air compliance’ records are consistently
maintained in a ‘controlled,’ retrievable fashion that would meet INEL
Quality Standards.” [INEL
Notegram, July 25, 1996 to C.L. Tellez, MS 3428 from M.E. Feldman, MS 3427 and
T.A Solle, MS 3428]
The 1996 INEEL Environmental Compliance Inventory compiled by DOE’s lead Management and Operations contractor, Lockheed Martin states:
AThe CPP Main Stack is one of 5 sources at the INEL [sic] which have unabated potential doses in excess of 0.1 mrem/yr., thereby requiring continuous monitoring of rad releases per NESHAPs. Since I-129 has been the single largest actual dose contributor for the INEL over the past several years it should be monitored to ensure compliance. Operation of the I-129 monitor has been unfunded and has not operated for most of the last 3 years due to the fact that CPP Main Stack I-129 releases do not exceed the regulatory threshold of 10% of the unabated potential dose. An INEL policy is needed which will assure this monitor remains funded and operational so that the I-129 contribution to INEL site dose can be adequately determined and reported.@ [December 1996, page 2.1.6] For the ICPP High-level Liquid Waste Evaporator the report states: AYit was confirmed that H-3 [radioactive tritium] concentrations had exceeded the limits specified by DEQ [Department of Environmental Quality]. [Page 2.1-5] AThe NWCF [Calciner] does not have mechanisms in place to fully satisfy the requirements (minimum data availability, CEMS >Out-of-Control= corrective actions, back-up means for determining NOx [nitrogen oxide] releases record keeping, reporting, etc.) of 40 CFR 60 Appendix F nor all aspects of QAPjP-043 implemented.@ [Page 2.1-8] AThe INEL has not defined the requirements and responsibilities for determining and reporting actual annual radiological releases. Environmental Affairs personnel primarily perform this activity at year-end. Few INEL facility personnel take an active role in evaluating actual releases, and a number of facilities take no actions during the course of the year to ensure adequate data is available.@ [page 2.1-8] CPP-659 (Calciner) monitoring system AYwill not meet the criteria specified in the current ANSI standard (nor is approved alternative required by NESHAPs. Estimates indicate this stack now exceeds the trigger level for which continuous monitoring is required.@ [Page 2.1-9] AThe INEL has not defined the requirements and responsibilities for performing Periodic Confirmatory Measurement (PCM) of the unabated potential radiological releases for affected facilities to ensure that appropriate monitoring is in place for significant sources. Required by NESHAPs, this activity is currently conducted largely as a paper exercise by Environmental Affairs personnel at year-end. Few INEL facilities are aware of the requirement to perform PCM, and fewer take measures during the course of the year to accurately determine their unabated potential releases. This may result in prolonged use and operation of a radiological release point with inadequate monitoring capabilities. (See 61.93 (b).@ [Page 2.1-10] [Environmental Compliance Inventory of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Volume 1 B ECI Results December 1996, INEL-96/0389, Lockheed Martin] [emphasis added]
In a June 2000 ATrial Burn@ report titled [New Waste Calcine Facility] NWCF Calciner Emissions Inventory BFinal Report for Test Series 1, 2, and 3 by DOE contractor Bechtel BWXT Idaho [INEEL/EXT-2000-00114] states: AIn addition to the offgas measurement, characterization of the Calciner influent streams and other effluent streams was also performed. First of a kind data on RCRA hazardous pollutants in the wastes and streams associated with the NWCF Calciner were obtained. Characterization data on the tank farm wastes and NWCF Calciner streams are required to support decisions on how the wastes should be handled regardless of whether the Calciner is the process employed for future treatment of INTEC wastes.@ [Page v, emphasis added] This statement of Afirst of a kind@ is as clear an indictment of decades of previous ICPP operations that never even tried to collect emissions data to determine RCRA compliance.
The above noted Calciner trial burn report acknowledges another DOE contractor (Radian Corp.) 1991 attempt to measure Calciner offgas found the emissions were so toxic that no reliable data was collected. The Radian reports states:
ARadian concluded from the laboratory study that the higher-than
typical levels of NO2 (around 20,000 ppmv) oxidized both the VOC and SVOC
analyses and the organic resins sorbents used to collect the samples.
Reactions with the analytes resulted in erroneous measurement, while
severe oxidation, ore even ignition, of the resin sorbents occurred in the
same instances. The high levels
of NO2 also caused significant corrosion and increased maintenance
requirements of the laboratory analysis equipment.
Technical problems were even noted when laboratory-blended simulated
NWCF Calciner offgas was diluted with air to levels comparable to the INTEC
main stack (400 ppmv).@
[page 5]
The report goes on to acknowledge volatile organic emissions of benzene, acetone, methylene chloride, and semi-volatile heavy metals like mercury that clearly require a Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) permit (15 U.S.C. ss 2615(a)(Subsection 16(a)) that DOE continues to obfuscate filing. [page 45] Sampling data show high concentration levels of chromium, cadmium, and mercury in the feed that ends up in the scrub solutions in near equal concentrations that are then sent to unpermitted evaporators like the PEWE or the LET&D. [page 76] One hundred and twenty-eight individual hazardous waste constituents are listed for the PEW feed/storage and treatment tanks in the Revised #19 RCRA Part A Permit Application, nearly all of which come under TSCA regulations (40 CFR ss 712.30) this requiring a separate TSCA Permit (15 U.S.C. ss 2615 et seq.) TSCA separately listed hexavalent chromium in the PEW waste list must be managed under 40 CFR ss 749.68, which again DOE has ignored.
A 1998 letter from DOE Office of Enforcement and Investigation to INEEL lead Management and Operations (M&O) contractor Lockheed Martin notes numerous Noncompliance Tracking System (NTS) states violations:
“… with the requirements of 10 CFR 830.120 Quality Assurance Requirements. The NTS report addresses a repetitive problem of maintaining the operability of radiation monitoring instrumentation and systems referenced in nuclear facilities authorization basis documents. The repetitive problem was identified by LMITCO on February 27, 1998, and reported to DOE on March 31, 1998.” “The evaluation identified a potential deficiency of not maintaining he operability of radiation monitoring instrumentation and systems which would be a violation of your Operation Safety Requirement (OSR) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSR).” “… we have concluded that … they constitute repetitive noncompliance with there requirements of 10 CFR 830.120 (C)(2(i), ‘Work Processes.’ We recognize that this repetitive problem was identified as one outcome of currently ongoing corrective actions.” “Based on our evaluation of the six occurrences as a group, it appears that these occurrences describe an attitude indifference toward and a lack of awareness of OSR/TSR requirements, thereof importance, implementation, and associated procedures. This attitude is not only apparent for workers at the operation level but also for facility mangers and other management staff.” Ineffective implementation of the corrective actions or subsequent similar repetitive breakdowns in radiation monitoring instruments and systems that have the potential to adversely affect nuclear safety, however, will be evaluated for appropriate enforcement action.”
“Non-operability Occurrences of Radiation Monitoring Instruments
and Systems; (1) Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP), June 19, 1997:
Flow instrumentation for online stack monitor was removed from service without
verification that other system was on line. (2) Nuclear Material Inspection
and Storage Facility, 7/22/97: Operational checks of criticality alarm
systems, were performed with inappropriate QA level, procedures.
(3) 7/28/97; Alarm set point of Criticality Alarm System (CAS) was set
above the set point in the associated Safety Analysis Report. (4) Test Reactor
Area, November 1997; One of two required stack monitors was taken out of
service without notification of operations management and without verification
that alternate monitoring had been established.
(5) Specific Materials Capability, Material Development Facility,
December 2, 1997; Filter change out for radiation monitoring system was
performed monthly instead of weekly as specified in the associated Technical
Specification Requirements. (6)
Advanced Test Reactor, Digital radiation Monitoring System, December 4, 1997:
Nineteen radiation alarm monitors did not actuate the local or remote alarm
when tested but were otherwise operable. [K. Keith Christopher, Director,
Office of Enforcement and Investigation, August 4, 1998, letter to John
Denson, Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies,
Subject Enforcement Letter]
A December 2000 Enforcement letter from DOE Headquarters Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement to INEEL lead contractor Bachtel, states that the monitoring deficiencies identified earlier in the above citation with Lockheed Martin remain uncorrected. This Enforcement letter to Bachtel:
“… refers to a recent investigation by the DOE regarding noncompliances with requirements of 10 CFR 830.120 (Quality Assurance Rule) occurring at the INEEL. The investigation reviewed five issues reported into the Noncompliance Tracking System (NTS) by Bachtel BWXT Idaho, LLC (BBWI) …” “Two of the NTS reports involved specific events that occurred before October 1, 1999, when BBWI began operating the INEEL but was responsible for implementing corrective actions. The remaining three reports involved programmatic breakdowns that continued to occur after BBWI assumed contractor operator status at INEEL.” “Our investigation determined a broad range of quality assurance deficiencies continues to exist at the INEEL.” “… the adequacy of corrective actions could not be determined in some areas because BBWI did not perform a root cause analysis of these issues. The quality deficiencies are significant and would typically warrant an enforcement conference. DOE recognizes that some noncompliances existed prior to October 1999, and were discovered by BBWI after is assumed operation of INEEL. Nonetheless, some of the programmatic issues continued to occur after October 1999 as evidenced by the quality implementation assessment findings.” “For example, BBWI identified problems with the maintenance of quality records at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTC) in September 1999. BBWI did not recognize the significance of the problems or use the results of its self-assessment for quality improvement purposes until the DOE Idaho Operations Office completed its assessment in February 2000, which documented deficiencies with quality records. Then, BBWI delayed until May 2000 to report the problem into the NTS. [ Christopher, R. Keith, Director, Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement, December 7, 2000 letter to Bernard L. Meyers, President Bechtel BWXT Idaho.]
Calciner campaigns since 1990 included: #3 (12/90 to 11/93); #4 (5/97 to 5/99); #5 (1/99 to 6/99); #6 (3/00 to 5/27/00). The High-level Liquid Waste Evaporator stated operation in ~1996. During this last decade the Process Equipment Waste Evaporator (PEWE) and the Liquid Effluent Treatment and Disposal Evaporator ran full time both generating considerable emissions, and thus mandating continuous radionuclide monitoring. The INEEL High-level Waste EIS notes that PEWEs bottoms tank storage represents a potential for a “criticality event releasing significant radioactivity to the atmosphere.” [5-206] Additionally, the PEWE bottoms tank contents is pumped back to the High-level Tank Farm, so DOEs assertion that the PEWE does not process HLW is bogus.
IV. Court Orders and Independent Reviews Mandate Change in DOEs Method of Operation
A successful lawsuit brought by Keep Yellowstone Nuclear Free and the
Environmental Defense Institute, et al. against DOE prevented the construction
of the plutonium incinerator portion of the INEEL Advanced Mixed Waste
Treatment Facility. Part of the
Settlement of the suit stipulated the creation of a Blue Ribbon Panel that
recently found that available non-incineration treatment technologies must
replace the DOE preference for incineration.
Other successful citizen suits shutdown incinerators at DOE’s Rocky
Flats Plant, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory for radioactive and chemical emissions violations.
A fourth successful lawsuit filed April 2, 1996 against DOE's Los
Alamos National Laboratory site for radioactive emissions violating the Clean
Air Act resulted in a court ordered independent monitoring program to ensure
compliance. [CCNS v. USDOE]
Exhaustive and highly credible scientific reviews have independently cast light on the hazard of DOE's Highly Efficient Particulate Arresters (HEPA) filter control systems at these DOE sites. Institute for Energy and Environmental Research's (IEER) Radioactive and Mixed Waste Incineration report cites the findings of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory internal review panel recommendations against a proposed mixed waste incinerator in California.