Secretary Bill Richardson
U.S. Department of Energy
1000 Independence Ave., S.W.
Washington, D.C.
20585
Beverly A. Cook, Site Manager
U.S. Department of Energy
Idaho Operations Office
850 Energy Drive, MS 1108
Idaho Falls, ID
83401
RE: Notice of Intent to Sue Over DOE’s Failure to Comply with the Resource Recovery and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. and the Clean Air Act in operation of the New Waste Calcining Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
Dear Sirs/Madam:
In accordance with the notice requirements of 42
U.S.C. §§ 6972(c) and 7604(b), the undersigned parties, Keep Yellowstone
Nuclear Free (“KYNF”), the Environmental Defense Institute (“EDI”), and David
McCoy, attorney and Idaho Falls resident (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”), hereby
provide you notice of our intent to commence a civil action under sections
6972(a) and 7604(a) for operating the facility known as the New Waste Calcining
Facility (“the Calciner”) at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory (“INEEL”) in violation of
the Resource Recovery and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. (“RCRA”)
and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7601 et seq. (“CAA”), and other federal
statutes enumerated herein. Pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 6972(c), we reserve the right to sue prior to sixty days for
violations of hazardous waste management under RCRA subchapter III.
Plaintiffs’ claims arise from DOE’s operation of the
Calciner, a high level liquid waste incinerator that began operations in
1982. The Calciner has to date
processed over four million gallons of high level waste, but the facility has
yet to receive a permit under RCRA, has operated in violation of the interim
status regulatory obligations, has violated air quality emissions requirements,
and has not met the environmental review requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). These violations represent not only a willingness
on the part of DOE and its regulatory overseers Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) and Idaho Division of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”) to default on their
statutory obligations. It also presents
a serious and immediate environmental risk that our environmental laws are
intended to avoid. Since its operation,
the Calciner and related facilities have experienced numerous accidents and
safety failures and have posed serious threats to human health and safety. See attachment “A” for an outline these
incidents.
Resource Recovery and Conservation Act
The Calciner has been operating without a permit under
RCRA for over eighteen years and on so-called “interim status” for over eleven
years. This violates both the spirit
and the letter of RCRA. RCRA was
enacted in order to ensure that hazardous waste management practices are
conducted in a manner which protects human health and the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 6902. The goal of the law was to require “that hazardous waste be
properly managed in the first instance thereby reducing the need for corrective
action at a future date.” By failing to
comply with the permit requirements stated in RCRA, the DOE has defeated and
nullified the objectives and national policies set forth in RCRA by the
impermissible use of interim status for the Calciner. Despite the requirements
of 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (a) and (c) no final permit has ever been issued or denied
for the Calciner as a hazardous waste treatment facility. Violations of the
interim status provisions include, but are not limited to, DOE’s failure to
provide the information reasonably required to process its application, see
42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(1)(c), and its failure to seek a part A application
modification regarding DOE’s decision to calcine sodium bearing waste.
The Calciner is also in violation of the interim status regulations which are intended to protect human health and the environment pending the approval or denial of an application under RCRA. 40 C.F.R. 264. For example, the DOE admitted in its January 2000 Emissions Inventory that it is unable to characterize the offgas and process solid and liquid streams as required under 40 C.F.R. § § 264, 265. Discussion with Idaho officials has revealed that DOE is not performing continuous real time monitoring at the Calciner, but only taking periodic grab samples in the 10 parts per million range, that DOE is not monitoring for particulate emissions, including alpha emitters such as plutonium. One reason given for the lack of adequate monitoring was that the emissions from the Calciner’s stack are so toxic that instruments are destroyed by corrosion very rapidly.
Other violations of 40 C.F.R. 265 include, but are not limited to: (1) trial burns were not conducted under restricted conditions, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 270.62); (2) waste feed to the incinerator was not monitored to see if it was within physical and chemical composition limits specified by a permit, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 264.345 (b) (3) no treatment of principal organic hazardous constituents to the standard for each waste feed to be burned, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 264.343 (b)(1); (4) no assurances as to design, construction and maintenance so that, when operated in accordance with operating requirements specified under 40 C.F.R. § 264.345; (5) no strict monitoring of the stack emissions; (6) lack of conditions or controls established with respect to fugitive emissions, maintenance of combustion zone pressure lower than atmospheric pressure, combustion gas velocity, automatic cut off of waste feed or requirements to cease operation when changes in waste feed exceeded design limits; (7) no requirements for daily visual inspection of the incinerator and associated equipment (pumps, valves, conveyors, pipes, etc.), nor for leaks, spills, fugitive emissions, and signs of tampering; (8) no requirements for weekly testing of emergency waste feed cutoff system and associated alarms, and/or (9) no requirements for monitoring and inspection data to be recorded with the records placed in an operating log, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 264.73.
Clean
Air Act
The
Calciner fails to comply with the CAA’s National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs”).
Specifically, the facility does not meet the NESHAP standard for
radionuclides. 40 C.F.R. §
61.90-61.97. The Calciner uses two
stacks to vent emissions: the “CPP-659 HVAC” stack and the “INTEC Main Stack.”
INEEL’s own reports establish that the particulate emissions from the calcining
off-gas are continuously monitored through the main stack, but there is no data
provided that support particulate emission data being continuously monitored
from the HVAC stack.
The Calciner HVAC stack is only continuously monitored for three contaminants: Americium-241, Cesium-137, and Plutonium- 239. The Main Stack is continuously monitored for eleven nuclides. However, neither stack is monitored for gross alpha or gross beta/gamma. Furthermore, Iodine-129 and tritium are only "estimated based on process knowledge." This results in a violation of reporting requirements submitted for the Main Stack that are not provided for the HVAC Stack.
There are no descriptions in the NESHAP Report of the actual monitoring instruments and how they operate, calibrating frequency, or any methodology on emission data collection or quality assurance process. There is no definition of what "continuous monitoring" means.
Cc:
Hon. Janet Reno
Attorney General
5111 Main Justice Bldg.
10th and Constitution Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20530
Charles Clarke
Regional Administrator
Region X
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Sixth Ave.
Seattle, WA
98101
Steve Allred
Administrator
Idaho Division of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, ID
83706
ATTACHMENT A
Accidents
at the New Waste Calciner (Calciner)and
related facilities at INTEC (formerly
Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) between 1988 and
September 1999
Source: U.S. DOE Office of Nuclear and Facility
Safety, Operating Experience Weekly Summary and U.S. DOE Daily Field Management
Reports, Lockheed Martin Idaho Co. unusual
occurrence reports, unless otherwise cited.
* 1988*
October 30: An INTEC Explosion causing one fatality
and also resulted in a Radioactive ruthenium filter gel release of 0.17 curies
at the Main Stack.
*1990*
Nov. 16; Contamination at 4,000 cpm beta-gamma spread
outside a controlled area at ICPP-603.
*1991*
Jan.29; Calciner stack monitor found out of
calibration.
Feb.11; ICPP fuel dissolver exploded, spraying three
workers with highly enriched uranium and heated nitric acid; a fourth worker
was also exposed when he came to their aid. The facility remains closed because
of explosion damage and high levels of contamination. The Office of Nuclear
Safety concluded that the initial contractor investigation & the corrective
actions taken by the DOE/ID were inadequate. [Judge Ryan Opinion @ 53].
June 10; The State of Idaho files RCRA air/water
quality violations and fines totaling $127,793.
June 25; An operator’s left hand was contaminated up
to 100 millirem beta gamma and 3,000 counts per minute beta gamma on his right
hand at the Calciner while cleaning liquid sample cell.
July 4; Denitrator Off-gas drain malfunction results
in high alpha contamination at ICPP (Zone-III).
July 25; Calciner activated rapid shutdown system due
to off-gas compressor shutdown during power failure.
Aug.6; Personnel contamination to 500 cpm (counts per
minute on radiation detection instruments) at ICPP-627 Radiological Materials
Area.
Aug.6; The Calciner shutdown due to plugged filters;
however, it took nearly three hours before the operators shut down and no spare
filter banks were available during that time.
Sept.13; Failure of the Calciner off-gas atmospheric
protection system (APS) High Efficiency Particulate Arrester (HEPA) filters.
The HEPA filters, numbers F-OGF-100/101/102 failed a special requested DOP
(dioctylphthalate) test after nine months of service. When the filters were
changed out it was discovered the filter media had deteriorated. Two of the
filters had the filter media missing or partially missing. The third filter's
media was intact, but was discolored. Depending on when the filters failed, the
APS may have operated for the entire nine months without HEPA filters.
ID-WINC-ICPP-1991-1058.
Nov.28; ICPP evacuated after
radiation alarms sound. [Times News
November 28, 1991]
Dec. 22; ICPP-604 Process off-gas System HEPA filter
monitors inoperable.
*1992*
Jan.6; Inspection found 9 alarms disconnected at the
ICPP.
Jan.19; ICPP Process Off-gas System blowers failed for
two days while Calciner and other operations continued to operate.
Jan.24 Calciner exceeded State limits on nitrogen
oxide on five different occasions between 6/89 to 1/92.
Apr. 1; Unauthorized removal of
criticality alarm system warblers at the ICPP.
Apr. 2; Employees forced to
stay inside of ICPP due to an unplanned radiation release from the main stack
containing 3 millirem per hour (mrem/hr) beta-gamma.
[ID-WINC-ICPP-1992-0035]. Contaminants
spread beyond the ICPP boundary fence.
Judge Ryan cited flakes the size of quarters falling on 40 acres around ICPP,
and DOE sent notice of this incident to Idaho and the Fort Hall Reservation
with a cover page erroneously stating "This is a Drill." [Ryan @ 53][also see Daily Operations Brief
of 4/3/92, stating flakes 2 inches in diameter were released]. The released
radionuclide composition was Cs-137, Sb-125, and Ru-106.
June 25; Personnel contamination to 3,000 cpm
beta-gamma at the ICPP Calciner.
July 1; Calciner HEPA filter failure due to rapid
pressure rise and defective or failed filter material. This incident occurred
while spare filter bank was undergoing filter change out and was not available
for use. Three hours elapsed before the decision was made to shut down the
Calciner.
July 18; ICPP Calciner unplanned shutdown due to
clogged HEPA filters.
July 25; Calciner activation of the rapid shutdown
system due to compressor failure.
Aug.2; Power failure at ICPP and 70 mph wind storm
causes significant building damage.
Aug.19; Personnel skin contamination at the ICPP New
Waste Calcining Facility.
Aug.21; Release of radioactivity from ICPP main stack
- 25,000 counts per minute (cpm).
Aug.25; Unauthorized disconnection of alarms in
ICPP-637.
Sept.1; Loss of stand-by power to evacuation sirens at
the ICPP Remote Analytical Lab.
Sept.12; Personnel contaminated to 20,000 dpm
(disintegrations per minute measured on a radiation instrument) at the ICPP New
Waste Calciner.
Sept.17; Power outage at ICPP-604 Waste Treatment and
loss of instrumentation and ventilation - these facilities operate the ICPP
off-gas emission systems.
Sept.21; Personnel contamination to 10,000 dpm in the
ICPP-604 sample corridor.
Sept.22; ICPP Calciner radiation detection instruments
found out of tolerance.
Sept.23; Three personnel contaminated to 1,500 cpm at
Calciner.
Sept.27; Sixteen radiation monitors found out of
compliance at ICPP and instead of replacing the monitors managers chose to
rescind the compliance order.
Oct.21;
Loss of control of radioactive material, building contamination to
50,000 dpm (disintegrations per minute
measured on a radiation instrument) at ICPP-603.
Nov.15; Personnel contamination to 400 cpm (counts per
minute measured on a radiation instrument) at the ICPP Calciner.
Nov.19; Personnel contamination to 10,000 cpm (counts per minute measured on a radiation
instrument) at the ICPP Calciner.
Nov.28; ICPP evacuated because of radionuclide
particulate releases at CPP-603.
Dec.1; ICPP High-level waste tanks WM-101 and 102
vault sump level instrument probes (leak detection) were discovered to be
connected to the transmitter in reverse.
Dec.27; Kerosene fire in the Calciner Cell of the New
Waste Calcining Facility. During cold operations of the Calciner kerosene fuel
which had leaked from a Calciner fuel nozzle ignited resulting in a small fire
in the Calciner vessel cell floor which burned for about 35 minutes. Nozzle
connection was installed improperly (threads reversed).
*1993*
Jan.4; Criticality Alarm System Warblers found Inoperable
in CPP-651 and 603.
Jan.6; Unsafe entry into ICPP WL-101/102 Tank vaults
by health physics technicians
not
wearing proper protection.
Jan 9; New Waste Calciner forced to shut down due to
plugged final off-gas filter plugging
Jan.28; New Waste Calciner again forced to shut down
due to defective off-gas filters
Mar.9; Calciner worker contaminated to 12,000
Disintegrations per minute (dpm) and other areas of the mezzanine where the
worker was were found to be contaminated to 100,000 dpm
Mar.13; Worker contamination to 800 dpm at CPP-604
tank farm.
*1996*
July 22; Five
construction workers were contaminated during demolition of the ICPP Waste
Calcine Facility. Whole body counts showed 500 mrem (millirem) internal
exposure to Cs-137, Sr-90, Pu-238, and Pu-239. The five workers were not
wearing respirators yet were working in the immediate area where another group
of workers were cutting and removing piping that contained contamination. LMITCO fined $25,000 by DOE for violations
of nuclear safety regulations under the Price Anderson Amendments Act. [Star
3/11/97]
June 5; Worker exposed to 40,000 dpm (Disintegrations per minute measured on a
radiation instrument) of Gd-153, Eu-152, and Co-60 during decontamination of
Hot Cell Facility despite wearing a double set of Personnel Protective
Equipment. [6/9/97 DOB].
Aug 25; Five workers were exposed to nitrogen oxides
while conducting a remote video inspection of underground ICPP Calciner valve
box. NIOSH safety limits of 5 ppm
(parts per million) were exceeded but the immediately dangerous to life limit
of 20 ppm were not exceeded.
Aug 25; State of Idaho Division of Environmental
Quality sent DOE/ID a Notice of Non-Compliance for 135 violations of Hazardous
Waste Management Act and set penalties at $892,725.
Sept 19; DOE Office of Enforcement and Investigation
issued Notice of Violation under the Price-Anderson Act to Lockheed Martin
Idaho Technologies and INEEL Operations Office for six Severity Level III
safety violations.
Dec 8; ICPP New Waste Calcine facility maintenance
fitter was contaminated after he removed his acid suit in a high contamination
area. A radiological control technician measured 8,000 dpm beta/gamma on the
fitter s knees, 3,200 dpm
(Disintegrations per minute measured on a radiation instrument)
beta/gamma on his stomach, and 39,000 dpm beta/gamma on his modesty clothing.
The fitter had removed his acid suit during the job because of heat stress
caused by inadequate breaks and excessive hours.
*1998*
Jan 6; INTEC fire
resulted from an overheated diesel powered water pump when the discharge line
froze; caused when an engine overheated
and caused a fire because the cooling water drain was plugged with ice and prevented circulation of cooling water
through the engine coolant heat exchanger.
Jan.19; Maintenance electrician contaminated at INTEC
with 12,000 counts per minute beta-gamma.
Gamma scan found cesium-137 contamination at 6,000 cpm. [1998-0002]
Aug.9; INTEC plant wide emergency communications and
alarm system failed and the backup power system and battery backup also failed.
Oct.7; Fire Alarms found inoperable at INTEC.
Sept.; DOE Office of Oversight Progress Report
September 1998 found that "Workplace safety at INEEL has deteriorated
since 1994" and that "corrective actions plan found that deficiencies
were not resolved and that lessons learned from previous accidents were not
being effectively applied. In environmental management and controls, data
indicate weak regulatory compliance and inadequate, short-term, quick-fix
solutions. Long term solutions are only in the conceptual stages, with no
defined strategies, plans of action, or milestones." "Specifically,
one-fifth of all INEEL occurrences in 1997 were related to radiation protection
(personnel contamination) and environmental management occurrences have
increased by one-third from 1994 through 1997."
Sept.1; INTEC radiation laboratory analysts received
internal plutonium-239 exposure from inhalation that measured 0.1 mrem
(millirem) from unprotected work on plutonium-contaminated graphite molds.
Sept. ; DOE Oversight Analysis Group issues Office of
Oversight Progress Report covering INEEL s non-compliance with environmental
regulations, poor implementation of worker safety and health programs and
privatization issues. The report cited, "workplace safety performance has
deteriorated," "recurring problems in work control and facility
authorization basis, noncompliance with environmental regulations...."
"INEEL has not established an effective process to pro-actively track and
prioritize corrective actions. Further, ES&H functions and activities are
not always integrated into programs or work planning." "Worker
competence and safety performance are also impacted by the reduction enforce at
INEEL since the beginning of integrated management. The reductions have
affected the experience level of workers and reduced morale. Since 1994, INEEL
has experienced to workplace fatalities, a serious electrical shock, and many
unplanned exposures and near misses involving workplace hazards."
"Significant weaknesses are also noted in INEEL s environmental management
program as shown by the site s having received four Notices of Violation from
the State of Idaho for environmental non compliance since 1994, as well as 4 of
the 26 DOE Enforcement Actions issued by DOE through June 1998." "In
recent years, weakness in work planning and controls have resulted in two Type
A accidents as well as many near misses involving workplace hazards. The
identified programmatic deficiencies include insufficient worker training, lack
of hazard identification and control, and inadequate supervision of work."
Dec.22; Six workers contaminated at the New Waste
Calcine Facility incinerator during waste transfer operations. Additionally,
two pickup trucks, some road surfaces, and hallway carpets in another INTEC
building were contaminated when workers left the Calciner.
*1999*
Jan. 7; New Waste Calciner Facility and CPP-665 and
679 fire detection system found inoperable for two weeks before corrected. Failure was due to degradation, however the
Calciner operator attempted to cover up the system failure by destroying
computer printout.
Jan. 11; Fire erupted in the New Waste Calciner
Facility while bringing the Calciner into operation; a flexible, braided
stainless steel oxygen hose for the Calciner vessel #4 fuel nozzle failed. This
failure resulted in a spray of kerosene mist, which ignited in the cell.
Jan.15; New Waste Calciner Facility incinerator fire
in the oxygen/kerosene fuel loop was caused by missing seals. It is believed
that absence of these seals allowed oxygen and kerosene to leak, mix and catch
fire at Calciner operating temperature.
Feb.3; Two of four air compressors fail at INTEC
jeopardizing operating systems.
Feb. 17; INTEC worker head and arms exposed to nitric
acid leak.
Feb.19; High-level waste Tank Farm error resulted in
3,301 gallons being transferred to the wrong tank.
Mar.8; INTEC diesel driven fire water pump batteries
explode during startup.
Mar.10; Power failure at INTEC lasted five hours.
Mar.16; Five New Waste Calcine Facility workers
exposed at the base of the main stack to methylene chloride (105 ppm) and
toluene (166 ppm) during off-gas sampling project. OSHA standard limits are 25 ppm.
April 1; Two New Waste Calcine Facility workers
received exposure to methylene chloride and toluene during off-gas sampling
over two month period. The exposure data indicated values that exceed twice the
value of the limits established for a 40 hour workweek. [1999-0006]
April 7; Key to high radiation area was left
unattended on a sign-on clipboard. This could
have
resulted in exposure to more than 1 rem/hr.
May 5; INTEC potable water supply found contaminated
with bacteria.
June 13; INTEC plant wide Emergency Communication
System found to be inoperable due to degradation.
July15; New Waste Calcine Facility shift supervisor
certification had expired two months prior in violation to operating rules.
Aug.23; Three of four air compressors fail New Waste
Calcine Facility and the fourth was unable to maintain plant air demands.
Aug.24; New Waste Calcine Facility evacuated when air
compressor ran out of fuel. This
resulted in shortage of plant air impacting operating facilities when pressure
dropped below the limits required to sustain operations. [1999-0011]
Sept.15; Portable breathing air compressor at INTEC
used passed air quality check expiration date.
Sept.20; Worker arms contaminated at INTEC Tank Farm
with 20,000 disintegrations per minute (dpm) or 50 mrem whole body dose through
protective clothing [1999-0011]
Representative Undated uncontrolled
hazardous/high-level radioactive mixed waste releases and spills [40 CFR
265.31] related to Calciner operations identified in Waste Area Group 3 (INTEC)
Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study*. These releases contributed to
significant ground water contamination. The High-level Tank Farm is used as a
liquid waste storage for the Calciner.
1. Calcine transport pipe (CPP-633) leaked between
Calciner and Storage Bin identified as CPP-13 contaminated 300 square feet of
soil that required decontaminated.
2. Calcine Vessel Decontamination 10 gallon leak
CPP-633 of hazardous/radioactive liquid containing 10 curies of radioactivity,
identified as CPP-35.
3. Calcine Trench hazardous/radioactive release
identified as CPP-93.
4. High-level Tank Farm service pipe to the Calciner
leaked 2,500 gallons near Valve Box A-2 releasing 46,400 curies of
radioactivity, identified as CPP-79.
5. Leak between tank WC-119 and WL-102 identified as
CPP-25
6. Steam Flush Explosion high-level tank lines
resulted in 13 acres contaminated, identified as CPP-26.
7. High-level waste tank WL-102 released 300 gallons
containing 1,000 curies of radioactivity identified as CPP-37 & 33.
8. High-level tank WM-181 line leaked 3,629 gallons
containing 46,400 curies of radioactivity, identified as CPP-28.
9.High-level tank WM-183 line leaked 14,000 gallons
containing 40,988 curies of radioactivity, identified as CPP-31.
10. High-level liquid waste above ground pipe leak at
Valve Box B-4, identified as CPP-32.
11. PEW Evaporator hazardous/radioactive 20,000 gallon
leak, PEW condensate identified as CPP-58E. The leak was caused by a failure of
the condensate transfer line between the PEW Evaporator and the Service Waste
Diversion System
12. High-level waste transfer line leaked 750 gallons
containing 8.44 curies of radioactivity, identified as CPP-36.
* Reference
Waste Area Group 3 Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study Final Work Plan, August 1995, prepared for US Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office, INEEL-95-0056.