January 16, 2002

 

Chuck Broscious

Executive Director

Environmental Defense Institute, Inc

P. O. Box 220

Troy, Idaho 83871-0220

V 208-835-6152

F 208-835-5407

 

Sent via Certified Mail Return Receipt Requested to:

Administrative Hearing Coordinator

Department of Environmental Quality

1410 N. Hilton

Boise, ID 83706

and

Office of Counsel

U. S. Department of Energy

785 DOE Place

Idaho Falls, ID 83402

 

  

Before the Director of the

Idaho Department of Environmental Quality

 

 

IN THE MATTER OF THE

HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT

ORDER GRANTING LIMITED

AND STORAGE PARTIAL                        ) REVIEW OF PERMIT

                                                                    ) Docket No 10HW-0109

PERMIT FOR UNITS A INEEL                 )

BLDGS. CPP 659/1659                              ) IDAPA 58.05.013 [40 CFR SS 124.19]

                                                                    )

                                                                    )

DAVID McCOY,                                        )

PETITIONER                                             ) ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE

                                                                   )  INSTITUTE, INC.’S AMICUS CURIE BRIEF

 

Introduction

 

            This brief is submitted by the Environmental Defense Institute, Inc., (EDI) a non-profit organization dedicated to promoting responsible public policy concerning Idaho’s human and natural environment and protecting the health and welfare of Idaho’s citizens and natural resources.  The majority of EDI’s members are Idaho residents, many of whom reside within the fifty mile impact zone of the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL).

            At issue is the Department of Energy (DOE) hazardous waste storage and treatment units identified in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Part B  permit application for Debris/HEPA Filter Leachate Processing at the INEEL Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) buildings CPP-659/1659.  Notice of Order is Docket No 10HW-0109, signed 12/18/01 by Robert Bullock, Hazardous Waste Permit Coordinator, Idaho Department of Environmental Quality. 

            EDI’s objective (via this Brief) is to appraise the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (IDEQ) of the gravity of this specific permit, and the environmental destruction created by the DOE’s mis-management of radioactive and hazardous chemical materials at this INEEL site.

            In view of IDEQ’s procedural errors, EDI presents additional flood-related information directly related to the subject permit operation’s waste inflo/outflow that are required by RCRA. (40 CFR 270.14 through 270.29)   It is imperative that the IDEQ take corrective action by denying or fundamentally requiring DOE to modify the subject Debris/HEPA Leaching Processing  hazardous waste permit. Specifically, EDI requests that IDEQ block the siting of radioactive and hazardous waste storage, treatment and disposal facilities in areas known to be susceptible to flooding from the Big Lost River and/or catastrophic failure of Mackay Dam, in addition to requiring DOE to evaluate alternative and less pollutant prone alternative waste processes.

            This Brief and its Attachments will identify additional facts and problems (intimately related to the subject permit via input/discharge) with DOE’s programs at the INEEL site that the IDEQ may or may not have considered in its deliberations.  Specifically, this brief will explain the unique nature of INTEC and related waste treatment/disposal operations flooding and the resultant dispersal of pollution via CPP-659/1659 and connected waste processing units into the Snake River Plain Aquifer (SRPA) and the resultant public health issues that imperil Idahoans that rely on the Snake River Aquifer to sustain their lives and property.  Processing of this radioactive waste at this specific location poses an immediate threat to public health and safety which warrants the IDEQ’s full consideration.

            EDI participated substantively in the development of David McCoy’s Appellant Brief, and therefore request that McCoy’s Appellant Brief be incorporated by reference and by attachment into EDI’s Amicus Brief as Attachment A. McCoy’s Brief offers a fully developed legal and evidentiary argument on the inadequacies of DOE’s RCRA Debris Processing permit application.

            It is EDI’s position that these additional facts support a finding that the IDEQ should deny DOE’s RCRA CPP-659/1659 permit as currently submitted based on the arguments presented below and attached.

            IDEQ’s Notice of Order (published 12/18/01) granting limited review stipulates that: “.... the issue to be addressed by the review will be limited to : Whether new information submitted by the Department of Energy reflecting flood plain mapping requires changes in the permit.  No other matters will be considered by the Director in his review of the petition.” [emphasis added] 

             EDI challenges these arbitrary and capricious restraints, however, absent any legal citations in Idaho Administrative Regulations, or Idaho Code pertaining to the public comment venue prescribed by the IDEQ Notice.   EDI additionally protests that as a regulatory agency, it limits the exchange of crucial information that impacts all INEEL radioactive and hazardous waste storage, treatment, and disposal operations within the Big Lost River flood-plain. EDI protests IDEQ’s attempt to consider the Volume 18 Permit as unrelated to the facilities such as the Process Waste Equipment Evaporator, the Tank Farm, the High Level Liquid Waste Evaporator, the ICDF and the new percolation ponds which are near to and will be utilized by buildings CPP-659/1659.  The effect of flooding at INEEL has not been considered for these other facilities which are linked to operations of the Debris Processing facility.

            EDI contends that IDEQ improperly reached a final decision to approve the Debris Processing RCRA Part B Permit prior to provision of a reopened public comment period in this matter. IDEQ has again denied the public a full opportunity for comment and response to those comments by IDEQ prior to a decision to issue the permit. Procedurally, IDEQ skipped a crucial legal step by not offering the public a new comment period prior to the appeal process.   IDEQ also failed to enforce the provisions under 10 CFR 1022 et seq. for early public notice and hearings for actions within the flood-plain.

            As a public interest organization, EDI finds IDEQ’s intransigence to these broader issues unconscionable. Moreover, IDEQ’s requirement that only “Amicus Briefs” from the public will be reviewed effectively intimidates members of the public who otherwise would offer written comments.  Amicus Briefs are “friend of the court” submittals.  [1]  There are no court proceedings here!  This is a State of Idaho administrative procedural process, and the use of Amicus Briefs as a comment criteria is nothing less than IDEQ’s effort to scare off any public comment on the permit issue.  The proceeding is before the Director of the IDEQ which has a vested interest in permit approval.  Additionally, IDEQ’s unwillingness to put copies of DOE’s responsive flood documents in the Administrative Record Repositories or on IDEQ’s website further demonstrates the agency’s desperate attempt to restrict public involvement in this permit issue.  These IDEQ actions logically force the question of whose interests are actually being protected by the agency mandated to protect the environmental, health, and safety of Idahoans.

            These issues must also be viewed in the context of a grossly inadequate DOE response to the National Environmental Policy Act requirement of comprehensive Environmental Impact Statements.  IDEQ also appears to have forgotten about applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements (ARARS) that it is mandated to enforce.   The INEEL site-wide Programmatic EIS offers less than a 1/3 rd page of text on the flooding issue. [2]   The INEEL High-Level Waste EIS offers about one page of text on INTEC flooding issues. [3]  This is also a violation, as discussed later,  10 CFR 1022.4(c) and Executive Order 11988, that requires of any DOE “crucial action plan,” a generation of a 500 year (0.2% ) flood-plain analysis.    The Council for Environmental Quality (CEQ) 42 U.S.C. §§ 1500 et seq. (42 U.S.C. 1502.25(a) requires that all nearby and related operations should be included in NEPA analyses and the EIS must address all relevant Executive Orders.   This has not been done.  Additionally, CEQ requires compliance with all relevant Executive Orders.   Executive Order No. 11988 (May 24, 1977) Guidance for Implementation of the Order is contained in the Flood-plain Management Guidelines of the U.S. Water Resources Council (40 FR 6030, Feb. 10, 1978).  Also Executive Order No. 11990 Protection of Wetlands (May 24, 1977) and CEQ section 1502.25 (a) requires preparation of a draft Environmental Impact Statement concurrently with and integrated with Executive Orders. DOE has not carried out this requirement of integrating an EIS with carrying out the mandates of E.O. 11988 and 11990 as per 10 CFR 1022 et seq.

            This permit for Debris and HEPA filter leaching process is misguided because it “violates the cardinal principle of radioactive waste treatment; namely, containing radioactivity rather than spreading it.” [4]   Specifically, the process employed is aqueous, and generates large quantities of radioactive and hazardous liquids that then are “processed” in the un-unpermitted-non-compliant Process Equipment Waste Evaporator (PEWE), Liquid Effluent Treatment and Disposal (LET&D) High-Level Liquid Waste Evaporator (HLLWE), and subsequently disposed in Percolation Pond operations at INTEC.  The Percolation Ponds themselves violate DOE Order 5400.5 related to phasing out existing soil column discharges. [5]   Utilizing the soil column for waste disposal becomes extremely problematic when floods flush contaminates into the underlying groundwater.

            A safer process (otherwise required by NEPA to consider alternatives) from a public health and environmental safety perspective would be super compaction and storage until a safe permanent waste repository is established to take the subject permit waste.  DOE refuses to acknowledge this alternative and has performed no cost benefit or environmental analysis of possible alternatives  to process the liquid waste in non-compliant operations and dump the solid residuals in non-compliant landfills on the INEEL site rather than present the required environmental analysis.  See ICDF discussion below.

           

Background

 

            According to U.S. Geologic Survey Studies (USGS):  “The need for flood control at the INEL [sic] has been recognized since the early 1950's when the Test Reactor Area and the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant were threatened by localized flooding that occurred because of ice dams in the Big Lost River. Repeated threats of flooding in the late 1960's, early 1970's, and early 1980's occurred when the Big Lost River filled Playas 1 and 2 and overflowed into Playa 3 near the [Test Area North]  Loss-of-Fluid Test facility.  High stream-flow and air temperatures as low as -47 degrees F in the winter of 1983-84 caused ice jams that imposed a danger of localized flooding.”  [6] 

            “Prior to irrigation development in adjacent valleys, the area now within the INEEL boundaries was the final destination of three important perennial streams, the Big Lost River, the Little Lost River, and Birch Creek. These streams emptied into playas and sinks on the floor of the 90 square kilometer area occupied during the Pleistocene by Lake Terreton. Although difficult to imagine given the current flows in the Big Lost River, land form remnants of a Pleistocene flood through Box Canyon on the INEEL's west side implicate that flood as the third most powerful known.” [7]        

            DOE and the state and EPA regulators have included the INEEL CERCLA Disposal Facility (ICDF) into the INTEC Record of Decision, so ICDF flood related information is germane to the subject CPP-659/1659 RCRA permit by virtue of its immediate proximity.  EPA consultants had the following to say about the history of the INTEC/ICDF area based on their site visit and analysis of the excavation material that showed the Big Lost River channel was previously under the INTEC/ICDF.  

            “Stockpiled ICDF excavation material was observed adjacent to the test pad area. Some of the materials observed were clean gravels with very little fine-grained material present. In one portion of the stockpile the gravels were several inches in diameter, approximating cobble size, rather than gravels. The implication of the presence of these fist sized sediments is that the Big Lost River has, in its past, produced high energy environments of erosion and deposition in the area of the present landfill excavation. The river would have to have left its current channel and carved through the adjacent overbank deposits with sufficient force to carry and then deposit cobbles greater than 3 to 4, and some up to 6 inches, in diameter. Significant water volumes and velocities are required to produce high energy deposits comprised of gravels and cobbles of this size range. These observations lead to the conclusion that location and design of the landfill in an area that has experienced fluvial flooding events of sufficient magnitude to produce these type of gravel deposits should consider the evidence of past events.”

            “The gravel and sand horizons comprising the majority of the sediments exposed in the ICDF excavation do not appear to be laterally extensive but are likely elongated channel deposits that extend roughly parallel to the present location of the Big Lost River channel. The path of the former stream channel left remnants of its passage outside the river’s present course as repeated channel cut and fill sedimentary features. Channel deposits are typified by coarse gravels deposited on the high energy side and finer grained gravels and sands on the lower energy side of the former stream channel.”  “One additional consideration, is that the thick sequence of predominantly gravel sediments observed at the ICDF site are the results of historic and repeated erosion and sedimentary redeposition processes associated with the Big Lost River.  The ability of the Big Lost River to recharge these deposits during periods when the Big Lost River is flowing, or flooding, has not been investigated.  If the river were to recharge the paleochannels when it is flowing above a particular stage then the resulting saturated sediments would be likely to provide lateral flow potential.  Although extensive saturated conditions were not observed in the excavation at the time of the visit, the Big Lost River is not currently flowing and, therefore, its ability to infiltrate former channel deposits is somewhat speculative. Infiltration of paleochannels in the type of depositional environment observed the ICDF excavation pit could, in the opinion of Gannett Fleming, be considered a consequence of resumption of flow of the Big Lost River.” [8]

                       

CPP-659/1656 Permit Issues                        

           

            The Department of Energy (DOE) issued a “Response to the Department of Environmental Quality [IDEQ] Request for Additional Flood-plain Information for Units Defined in the Volume 18 HWMA/RCRA Part B Permit application for INEEL, January 18, 2001.” [9]  This DOE (EDF-1747) report cites on page 2: “In 1989, INEEL published a report [Koslow (1986)] containing calculated flow volumes and water-surface elevations which occur during a peak flow in the Big Lost River at the INEEL. [10]  This INEEL study included the assumption that the 100-year peak flow and failure of Mackay Dam occur simultaneously, and thereby estimated that the peak flow in the Big Lost River is equal to 28,500 cubic feet per second [cf/s] at the INEEL diversion dam.”  “Presently, the water surface profile associated with a 28,500 cf/s flow is considered to be an upper bound on potential flooding at the INEEL.  The particular water surface profile obtained from the INEEL study is used as a basis for the present [HWMA/RCRA Permit] analysis.” (Ibid )

            The topographic map [intec_permit_1999_200ft-el_v4, date drawn: 9/11/2001] provided to IDEQ by DOE does not satisfy the requirements for a accurate flood plain map because the map is not based on adequate data which includes both riverine and overland flow information.  40 CFR § 270.14 requires the use of a flood plain map which maps the flow of flooding from “any source”.  (See, 40 CFR 264.18(b)(2)(i ) ).  A disclaimer on the topographic map of the INTEC area for the Volume 18 permit map provided by DOE states that the “Flood elevation indicated in this report and on this map is considered by DOE to be interim, pending issuance of a final flood plain determination under 10 CFR 1022.”  The elevation shown on the topographic map of 4916 feet at INTEC is incorrect if the HLW/EIS figure of 4917 is instead utilized.            

            The 12/99 INEEL High-level Waste Environmental Impact Statement (HLW/EIS) cites (in two different sections)  the same Koslow (1986) report to establish the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) at INTEC at 66,830 cf/s, reaching an elevation of 4,917 feet above sea level. [11]  This represents a completely, and radically different interpretation by separate DOE officials of the data from the same Koslow (1986) report.  Specifically, the HLW/EIS interpretation of 66,830 cf/s compared to the EDF-1747 report interpretation of 28,500 cf/s.  Additionally the EDF-1747 report, again citing Koslow, states the flow rate at 2.2 feet/sec while the HLW/EIS cites 2.7 feet/sec.  This flow rate is crucial due to the resulting erosion to facilities during a flood.  “If, as a result of this [HLW]EIS, DOE decides to build facilities within the flood plain at INTEC, then some form of mitigation would be necessary to assure that INTEC facilities would not be impacted by localized flooding.” [12]  The 1/18/01 INEEL Bechtel EDF-1747 cover letter to IDEQ states “For the purposes of Volume 18 permit application, all units (with the exception of CPP-666) are in the 100-year flood-plain. This determination is based on Volume 3 (Revision 6, July 1993) of the RCRA Part B Permit application for the INEEL which currently contains a report generated in 1986, EGG-EP-7184, entitled “Flood Routing Analysis for a Failure of Mackay Dam”

            DOE’s report goes on to state: “In the INEEL [EDF-1747 ] study, 57,740 cf/s was estimated to occur at Mackay Dam. The flow is attenuated downstream, and the INEEL diversion dam located in the southwestern part of the INEEL was estimated to receive 28,500 cf/s.”

            Why are these conflicting 100-year flood numbers important?   These conflicting numbers are important because they go to issues of DOE’s credibility with respect to the use of the flood-plain and the lack of safety margins which exist for INTEC facilities within the flood-plain.  The deliberate selection by DOE of lower estimated flood levels for the Volume 18 Part B Permit is indicative that the INTEC New Waste Calciner Facility (CPP-659) is not capable of sustaining a major flood and also meeting regulatory requirements under 40 CFR 270.14, 40 CFR 264.18, and 10 CFR 1022.  EDI contends that INTEC (CPP-659 and related waste influent/effluent units) do not meet regulatory requirements. The huge discrepancy and contradictions between the interpretation of the available research reports coupled with DOE’s contrived selection of studies and manipulation of data to achieve lower peak flood elevations at INTEC provides grounds for denial of the proposed Debris RCRA permit.

            The Volume 18 Debris Processing liquid effluent is linked to the ICDF, but the two processes are being considered in isolation to prevent the public from realizing and analyzing the environmental relationship of these and other facilities to the flood-plain.  The new flood-plain information must necessarily be considered in relationship to the Debris Processing and the ICDF and new percolation ponds.  DOE’s lengthy history of activities which have contaminated the groundwater must be brought to a halt.  

            The Department of Energy (DOE) Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) issued a Record of Decision in October 1999 to, among other things, construct an on-site mixed hazardous and radioactive processing and waste dump.[13]  This decision was made within the Superfund (CERCLA) process with the concurrence of the State of Idaho and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  Initially, this was welcome news since the Environmental Defense Institute (EDI) has for years criticized DOE’s illegal waste “disposal” practices in dumps that would not even meet municipal garbage landfill regulations let alone those which regulate radioactive and hazardous chemical waste.  After detailed analysis of the Record of Decision, it is clear that DOE plans to repeat the mistakes of the past by siting the new dump (called the INEEL CERCLA Disposal Facility) (ICDF) not only in a flood zone, but over top of Idaho’s sole source Snake River Aquifer which sustains more than 200,000 families. 

            In short, the issue is not the construction of the new dump, but the issue is where it is to be built on the INEEL site. EDI’s position is that there are credible alternative sites on the INEEL that are not over the aquifer or in a flood zone. See discussion below on alternate sites not fully considered by DOE.  The ICDF siting question is germane to the Debris Processing Permit due to the fact that solid/liquid effluent will be sent to the ICDF and the new INTEC percolation ponds, and is inconsistent with RCRA’s “cradle to grave” requirement for hazardous waste management. 

            Additionally, DOE is violating other environmental laws by claiming that the CERCLA process waives the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) among other laws.  Attorneys conversant in the regulations say CERCLA only waives the permitting and NEPA requirements in the direct removal and remediation of a contaminated site.  CERCLA does not in this case waive the RCRA permitting or NEPA requirements on a major $140 million ICDF dump project.  Specifically, the equivalent requirements under NEPA would require DOE to evaluate, in an Environmental Impact Statement, the credible alternative siting locations for the ICDF.  This was never done.  Yes, DOE evaluated alternatives for on-site versus off-site disposal.......but not alternative on-site locations.  Once again, the legal requirements are obfuscated not only by DOE but by the State of Idaho and the Environmental Protection Agency.  Since this appears to be a “done deal” between DOE and the regulators demonstrated by IDEQ’s curtailment of procedures to involve and protect the public, it appears the public’s only recourse is litigation.  Once again the public’s rights have been trampled.

            From a  review of the available and numerous US Geological Survey (USGS), and other  reports related to INEEL flooding scenarios and flood control infrastructures, it is clear that DOE and the regulators ignored this information. See discussion below on additional reports not utilized by DOE.  Moreover, DOE ignored the USGS  recommendation that additional analyses must be conducted prior to any final siting decisions being made for new waste internment and disposition of existing buried waste.  Specifically, USGS recommended a two dimensional model to expand the 1998  USGS one dimension model  to include the upper 95% confidence flow estimates of 11,600 cubic feet per second for the Big Lost River 100-year flood, and include modeling for the upper range limit of the 500-year estimated flow rate in the Big Lost River flood plain on the INEEL. [14] Modeling based on the upper 95% confidence flow rate would change the topographic map and/or coupled with excavation elevations more than likely result in inclusion of the ICDF, the new percolation ponds and other structures at INEEL being within the flood plain.

            A 1972 USGS study notes: “The need for flood control at the INEL [sic] has been recognized since the early 1950's when the Test Reactor Area and the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant were threatened by localized flooding that occurred because of ice dams in the Big Lost River. Repeated threats of flooding in the late 1960's, early 1970's, and early 1980's occurred when the Big Lost River filled Playas 1 and 2 and overflowed into Playa 3 near the Loss-of-Fluid Test facility.  High stream-flow and air temperatures as low as -47 degrees F in the winter of 1983-84 caused ice jams that imposed a danger of localized flooding.”  [15]   The 1972 USGS study notes: “First, a tentative hypothesis may be made that Mackay Dam may be overtopped and fail due to floods of not much greater recurrence interval than that of the maximum floods considered in the paper [15 to 300-year recurrence intervals].” [16]                

            DOE is constructing the ICDF as a step toward meeting regulatory requirements in the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) Subtitle-C hazardous waste disposal criteria. After 25 years of thumbing its nose at RCRA, DOE finally is making a gesture toward compliance after five decades of mismanagement of its waste streams that cause massive environmental contamination.  Estimated cleanup costs of this INEEL debacle are in the range of $21.4 billion, which will come out of our pockets as taxpayers.  DOE’s decision to finally comply with RCRA is marred by the wrongheaded choice of location, when other on-site locations would not pose the same risks to the aquifer that is already severely contaminated from INEEL waste.

            DOE is constructing the ICDF immediately south of the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) also now called INTEC mainly for economic reasons.  It is close to the ICPP where much of the waste will be generated and it is near/over existing waste water percolation ponds which are on the Superfund cleanup list, and it is over extensive soil contamination caused from ICPP stack releases.  In other words, “kill three wasted birds with one stone.” 

            The US Geological Survey released a 1998 report that modeled the median  100-year flow rates in the Big Lost River (that flows by the ICPP) down stream of the INEEL Diversion Dam (6,220 cf/s).  The USGS report cross section number 22 at the ICPP puts the median flood elevation at 4,912 feet.[17]  Again, this is only the mean flow rate (as opposed to the maximum rate of 11,600 cf/s) of just a 100-year flood, and not including any additional cascading events like the failure of Mackay Dam. The USGS flood map shows the northern half of the ICPP under water.  There are only five-foot differences between the ICDF (south end of ICPP) elevation of 4,917 feet and the USGS predicted elevation of 4,912 feet through the middle of the ICPP. The USGS study also employed current modeling techniques and plotted 37 separate cross sections on the INEEL site.  The ICPP as a whole is about as flat as a table top with only a couple feet change in elevation north to south.[18]  The crucial point here is that even the slightest variation in a Big Lost River flood would put the ICDF underwater assuming the dump was on the surface.  Proportionally less variation in floods would inundate the dump the deeper the ICDF is buried below the surrounding terrain.

            An earlier USGS study in 1996 also estimated the flow range for the Big Lost River at the INEEL;   “The upper and lower 95-percent confidence limits for the estimated 100-year peak flow were 11,600 and 3,150 cubic feet per second (cf/s), respectively.” [19]

            Since 1950, INEEL has experienced significant flooding events (localized and site-wide) in 1962, 1965, 1969, 1982, and 1984.  In an effort to mitigate the flooding problem, DOE built a diversion dam on the Big Lost River that is designed to shunt flood waters to the south and away from INEEL facilities.  USGS’s 1998 report that modeled the mean (midrange) 100-year flow rate of 7,260 cf/s upstream of the INEEL diversion dam. USGS estimated that the Big Lost median flow rate downstream of the diversion dam at 6,220 cf/s with a thousand cf/s going down the diversion channel for a total median flow rate of 7,260 cf/s upstream of the INEEL diversion dam. [20]  “This peak flow was routed down stream [of the Big Lost River] as if the INEEL diversion dam did not exist.  On the basis of a structural analysis of the INEEL diversion dam (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) assumed the dam incapable of retaining high flows.  The Corps indicated that the diversion dam could fail if flows were to exceed 6,000 cubic feet per second.”[21] 

            This USGS study acknowledged that the northern half of the ICPP would be flooded with four feet of moving water, even at this midrange (mean) flow rate. If ICDF excavation goes two feet below present surfaces, it will be below the elevation of the mean 100-year flood zone. Plans are to excavate ICDF pits most of the entire 50 feet to bedrock.

            Since the radioactive waste would be extremely hazardous for tens of thousands of years and flooding would flush contaminates down into the aquifer, a conservative risk assessment would model the upper 95-percent confidence limits for the estimated 100-year peak flow of 11,600 cf/s.  USGS has proposed this additional research to DOE, but the Department is not willing to provide the funding. A USGS hydrologist notes,  “The flow of 11,600 cfs represents the upper 95 percent confidence limit flow for the estimated 100-year peak flow (Kjelstrom and Berenbrock, 1996, p6). Future modeling needs are to model the area within this flow.  We’ve expressed this to the INEEL and also have expressed that the WSPRO model used has limitations and that an application of more stringent models (two dimensional) is needed to refine and better delineate the extent of possible flooding of the Big Lost River.” [22] 

            USGS estimates the mean 500-year Big Lost River flood rates at 9,680 cf/s (34% greater flow rate than the mean 100 year flood).[23]  This 500-year flood would inundate the ICPP and surrounding area.   These potential hazards are being ignored when making hazardous mixed radioactive waste internment decisions in these vulnerable areas despite the long-term consequences and the potential for additional aquifer contamination.

            Cascading events also are not considered. This is known as a worst case scenario where one event triggers another event.  For instance a 500-Year flood  plus failure of Mackay Dam (built in 1917) resulting in estimated flows of 9,700 + 54,000 cubic feet per second respectively would be an example of a cascading event. Failure of Mackay Dam is non-speculative in view of the 1976 failure of the Teton Dam of similar construction and the fact that Mackay Dam lies within 11 miles of a major earthquake fault line that produced the 1983 Borah Peak 7.3 magnitude quake.   An internal 1986 DOE report that analyzed the impact of Mackay Dam failure scenarios notes that, “Mackay Dam was not built to conform to seismic or hydrologic design criteria,” and  ”the dam has experienced significant under seepage since its construction.” [24]  This EG&G study acknowledged that the ICPP, Naval Reactors Facility, and the Test Area North (LOFT) facilities would be flooded with at least four feet of water moving at three feet per second.

            The 1998 USGS study did not consider cascading events but noted previous studies showing that failure of Mackay Dam alone would result in 6 feet of water at the INEEL Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) waste burial grounds. [25]   Other studies recognized by USGS note that,  “Rathburn (1989, 1991) estimated that the depth of water at the RWMC, resulting from a paleo-flood [early] of 2 to 4 million cf/s in the Big Lost River in Box Canyon and overflow areas, was 50-60 feet.”  “If Mackay Dam failed, Niccum estimated that peak flow at the ICPP would be at 30,000 cfs.”  [26]  Comparing these flow rates with the USGS estimate 100-year mean flow of 6,220 cfs that would flood the north end of the ICPP with four feet of water, and a Mackay Dam failure becomes a real disaster potential with respect to the existing underground waste tanks and underground spent reactor fuel storage and other related CPP-659/1659 operations at the ICPP.

            DOE is relying extensively on the Big Lost River Diversion Dam (located at the western INEEL boundary) to shunt major flood waters away from INEEL facilities.  The last comprehensive analysis of this diversion dike system (below the diversion dam) was conducted by USGS in 1986 in a report titled Capacity of the Diversion Channel below the Flood Control Dam on the Big Lost River at the INEL.  In this study USGS estimated a mean flow rate of 9,300 cf/s, 7,200 of which went into the diversion channel and “2,100 cf/s will pass through two low swells west of the main channel for a combined maximum diversion capacity of 9,300 cf/s.”  “A sustained flow at or above 9,300 cf/s could damage or destroy the dike banks by erosion.  Overflow will first top the containment dike at cross section 1, located near the downstream control structure on the diversion dam.”  [27]  This USGS study did not analyze the construction of the diversion dikes but they would likely fail as did the upstream diversion dam, built at the same time, that the Army Corps of Engineers found structurally deficient.  “On the basis of a structural analysis of the INEEL diversion dam (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, written comments, 1997), the dam was assumed incapable of retaining high flows.  The Corps indicated that the diversion dam could fail if flows were to exceed 6,000 cf/s.  Possible failure mechanisms are: (1) erosion of the upstream face of the dam that results from high-flow velocities and loss of slope protections (rip-rap), (2) overtopping of the diversion dam by flows exceeding the capacity of the diversion channel and culverts, (3) piping and breaching of the diversion dam because of seepage around the culverts, and (4) instability of the dam and its foundation because of seepage.”[28]

            Failure of the diversion dam and/or the diversion channel dikes would also directly impact the Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) waste burial grounds and the site of the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment (AMWTP) that likely will receive CPP-659 Debris and HEPA Filter process waste.  A 1986 USGS study shows the flood levels (at 7,200 cfs) in the Diversion Channel opposite the RWMC at 5056 feet above sea level.  [29]  The AMWTP permit shows building elevations at 5,019 and ground levels at the RWMC at 5,012.  [30]  That is a difference of some 37 feet between flood levels in the Diversion Channel and AMWTP buildings. In blunt terms 37 feet under water if the diversion channel dikes fail, which is likely given the poor construction of the diversion dam itself and the same construction applied to the diversion channel dikes.

            Rather than address the 100-year flood coupled with Mackay Dam which DOE utilized for INTEC, the DOE avoids the Koslow and other studies for the RWMC by using an outdated 1993 Dames and Moore study which fails to address the 1986 Koslow report entirely.  On the basis of the 1993 Dames and Moore study, the DOE makes the spurious claim that Building “WMF-676 is not located within a 100-year flood-plain.” (AMWTF HWMA/RCRA Treatment Permit, page 18). 

            Just as DOE refused to consider the implications of the 1998 USGS study for INTEC, this is another example of the DOE pattern of picking and choosing studies to support the end goal of lower flood elevations or being outside the floodplain thus placing public health and safety at risk.  The topographic map provided on the basis of the Dames and Moore study is wholly deficient as a true accurate and complete description for the floodplain at RWMC. 

            IDEQ must begin to recognize this endemic failure of the DOE to protect the aquifer and require DOE to comply with and fulfill the floodplain requirements at the numerous locations at INEEL.  The only way to achieve this is for IDEQ to require a RCRA and 10 CFR 1022, NEPA type of comprehensive floodplain analysis for all facilities at INEEL rather than the piecemeal review of isolated, disconnected, counterfeit, inconsistent, self-serving analyses presented by DOE on a facility by facility basis.  The abysmal 50-year history of failure of the DOE to responsibly deal with radioactive and hazardous wastes specifically in the floodplain should be halted by IDEQ.  IDEQ should recognize that DOE is incapable of protecting the aquifer and that permitting more critical actions in the floodplain will only lead to additional failures and damage to the aquifer.] 

            The March 29, 1993 Dames and Moore “Flood Evaluation Study Radioactive Waste Management Complex Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Idaho Falls, Idaho” used for the December 2001 Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project HWMA/RCRA Treatment Permit, fails to reference the 1986 Koslow 100-year flood with the collapse of Mackay Dam scenario.  The Flood Evaluation Study (p. 7) only examines flood values for “The watershed area contributing surface water runoff to the RWMC is approximately four square miles (2,592 acres).  This area is not affected by the INEL diversion structure on the Big Lost River.”               Even without the addition of the flows postulated by 1986 Koslow study, the RWMC structures may not be able to withstand the flood from the four square miles of watershed.  The 1993 Study states (p. 66): “Field inspection of the dikes, railroad embankments, and culverts indicates that these structures may not be able to withstand a severe flood event.  Design details of these structures are not readily available.  If any of these structures fails, then the attenuation considered in routing flood hydrographs through the site drainage system will be partially or completely lost.  This will result in comparatively higher flood peaks at the downstream locations.  If the breaches or breaches occur during a storm event they will generate flood waves similar to a dam-break situation. ... [T]he resulting flood peak may approach or exceed the PMF peak. ... Evaluation of the impacts of such contingencies is beyond the scope of this study.”

            A 1976 USGS report notes,  “The burial ground is within 2 miles (3.2 km) of the Big Lost River and the surface is approximately 40 feet (12 m) lower than the present river channel. Sediments in the burial ground contain grains and pebbles of limestone and quartzite, suggesting that in recent geologic past, flood waters of the Big Lost River flowed through the burial ground basin.  Two eroded notches or ‘wind-gaps’ in the basalt ridge bordering the west of the burial ground also suggest past Big Lost River floods.”  “A large diversion system on the Big Lost River was constructed by the AEC to control flood waters by diverting water into ponding Areas A, B, C, and D.  The nearest of these, Area B is less than a mile [south] from and about 30 feet (9m) higher in elevation than the burial ground.” [31] 

            USGS Arco Hills SE and Big Southern Butte quadrangle topographic maps clearly show the RWMC flooding vulnerability as do other USGS reports that note,  “If [diversion] dike 2 [at ponding Area B] fails, large flows will drain directly toward the solid radioactive waste burial grounds.” [32]  These vulnerabilities must be taken into consideration when DOE attempts to leave the buried transuranic waste at the RWMC and not exhume and relocate it to a safe permanent repository.

            Building dams around the INEEL CERCLA Disposal Facility (ICDF) as was done at the RWMC is not an acceptable flood protection answer because lateral water migration will go under the dams and local precipitation will be held in exacerbating the leachate conditions.  The liner of the ICDF will not be capable of maintaining integrity with the increased hydraulic pressure during a flood because liners are only capable of blocking what minimal surface water may leak past the cap and infiltrate the waste.  There are legitimate reasons why dumps (even municipal garbage dumps) are not allowed by statute in flood zones or above sole source aquifers.  Dams by definition are only functional if there is regular maintenance which cannot be assumed once DOE ends institutional control of INEEL in a hundred years.  Dumping hazardous waste on top of the ground and mounding the cover over it will result in the cap eroding over the long-term which again is unacceptable. Regulator’s contention that there is a degree of efficiency in co-locating the ICDF with the ICPP percolation ponds that they must be remediated along with the “windblown” soil contamination area around the percolation ponds not only defies’ common sense, but is also illegal.                   

            DOE is not utilizing an internal study that identified at least two such sites (on the INEEL) where the Lemhi Range meets the Snake River Plain that are not over the aquifer. [33]  DOE has not seriously considered these alternative sites as would normally be required under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), stating that the sites were eliminated from consideration due to increased seismic activity. There is no documented evidence of this alternative site seismic analysis.  No empirical risk assessment was conducted to compare the relative risk of a location over a sole source aquifer and in a flood plain (ICPP) as opposed to a site with a slightly higher seismic risk not over the aquifer or in a flood zone (Lemhi Range terminus). Other credible options include purchasing land contiguous to the northern end of the INEEL site near the terminus of the Bitterroot Range that also would be off the aquifer and not in a flood zone and have more soil cover over the bedrock. 

            Another misguided project (recipient of the subject Debris Processing Permit) outlined in DOE’s October 1999 Record of Decision is the construction of new ICPP process waste percolation ponds midway between ICPP and Central Facilities Area to the south. [34]

            Nuclear Regulatory Commission restrictions prohibiting citing radioactive waste disposal dumps on 100-year flood plains must be observed. [ NRC 10 CFR ss 61.50] This NRC regulation applies for all radioactive waste and mixed radioactive waste, which is the case at INEEL.  The reason for these restrictions is because the flood water will leach the contaminates out of the waste and flush the pollution more rapidly into the aquifer.  Since these wastes will remain toxic for tens of thousands of years, they must be disposed of responsibly in a safe permanent repository.

            Nuclear Regulatory Commission restrictions must be kept in mind also with respect to the ICPP high-level waste tanks that are some forty feet underground as well as the underground spent reactor fuel storage and calcine storage bins at the ICPP.  Water acts as a moderator and if the underground spent fuel vaults are flooded, it could cause a criticality.  All of these underground high-level waste sites are extremely vulnerable. Former ICPP workers recall stacking sandbags six feet high around the plant during a Spring flood about ten years ago.  The added external hydrologic pressure on the high-level waste tank concrete vaults could collapse the vaults and the tanks inside, and thus release the contents. These risks must be considered when DOE decides to leave the high-level waste tank sediments permanently in place as a cost cutting measure.

            The ICDF, siting, engineering design, and waste acceptance criteria (WAC) must be developed with public involvement through a free and open discussion.  The legal requirements of the process are spelled out in the National Environmental Policy Act that requires Environmental Impact Statements and public hearings.  Only un-containerized wastes that can be compacted during placement should be allowed so as to minimize subsidence caused by container decomposition. Biodegradable, VOC, collapsible, soluble, TRU, or Greater than Class C Low-level, and Alpha-low-level waste must also be excluded from the ICDF dump and sent off-site.  Prior to completing the ICDF Title II Design, workshops should be convened for stakeholders to comment on the proposal in addition to the NEPA requirements.   Waste Acceptance Criteria maximum contaminate concentration levels must be determined from waste sampling prior to being mixed with any stabilizing materials.  In other words, ”dilution is not the solution to pollution”.   

            USGS reports identified factors favoring downward waste migration.  “In order for waste isotopes to be carried downward by water, four basic requirements are needed: 1.) availability of water, 2.) contact of the water with the waste, 3.) solubility or suspendability of the waste in water, 4.) permeability in the geologic media to allow water flow downward.” [35]  This USGS report describes in detail how all four conditions are met at INEEL including the solubility factor where they note “Hagan and Miner (1970) leached five different categories of solid waste from Rocky Flats [the main source of plutonium in the RWMC] with ground water from the INEL and Rocky Flats and measured the plutonium concentrations and pH of the leachate.  They found the highest Pu-239 concentration in leachates from the acidic-graphite wastes, 62,000 to 80,000 ug/l plutonium or (3.8 x 10 ⁹ to 4.9 x 10 ⁹  pCi/L).” [Ibid]

            The most reliable indicators of contaminate migration are onsite sampling data. Cesium-137, plutonium-238,-239,-240 were all found at the 240-foot interbeds under the RWMC. [IDO-22056@74]  Forty-one % of the samples from the 240 foot interbeds contained radio­nuclides. [Ibid.@87]  Other litera­ture confirmation of plutonium at 240 feet in­cludes: "Radio­nuclides (including Pu-238.-239.-240, Am-241, Cs-137, Sr-90) have been detected in soils and in sedimentary interbeds to a depth of 240 feet beneath the RWMC, (Hodge et al, 1989)."  "Posi­tive values for Pu-238,-239,-240 were detected in samples obtained from the 240 foot interbed in bore hole DO2."[DOE/ID-10183@134-145][DOE/ID/12082(88) @14-16]   Radio­nuclides are also con­firmed in the aquifer ­under the RWMC. [EG&G-WTD-9438@25] USGS water sampling data at the 600 foot levels, expressed in pico curies per liter (pCi/l) show:

 

Groundwater Sampling Data at 600 Feet Under RWMC

Nuclide	Concentration       pCi/L	Drinking Water Std. pCi/L
Tritium	10,000.00	20,000.00
Cobalt-57	48.00	1,000.00
Cobalt-60	100.00	100.00
Cesium-137	400.00	119.00
Plutonium-238	9.00	7.02
Plutonium-239-240	0.14	62.10
Americium-241	15.00	6.34
Strontium-90	10.00	8.00

 [IDO-22056 @66]   * The drinking water standard for gross alpha (total of all alpha emitters) is 15 pCi/l.

 

            For more information on the contaminate migration from INEEL buried waste at the RWMC see EDI Citizens Guide to INEEL page 130 available on request.

            ICDF site selection is illegal under Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) rules that prohibit siting of radioactive waste dumps in 100-year flood plains (10 CFR 61.50) which the agencies are obliged to conform to if their commitment to Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirement (ARAR) is genuine.  Both RCRA and NRC regulatory apply to INEEL waste management of its waste.

            USGS conducted an extensive study in 1998 that defined the upper and lower 95% confidence level on the flow rates for a 100-year flood.

            1. The upper rate is estimated at 11,600 cfs and the lower rate is 3,150 cfs

2. USGS chose for some unknown reason (perhaps pressure from DOE) to plot only the mean flow rate (average between upper and lower) of 6,220 cfs.   DOE plotted the map and not the upper flood limit in  USGS.  The USGS  is not listed as the agency on the Flood Map Legend that did the plotting.  The INEEL Spatial Analysis Laboratory is on the Legend, not USGS.  Who is supposed to be responsible for plotting the map?

3. USGS assumptions base on previous Army Corps of Engineers and other EG&G studies that the Diversion Dam would fail with flows in excess of 6,000 cfs so the diversion dam was mostly discounted.

4. USGS plotting of the mean 100 year flow rate does not define the flood zone.  It only shows where the likely areas are that will be effected during an average flood.  This mean plot should never be used for making major facility siting decisions.

5.  The appropriate definition of the 100 year flood zone is to plot the upper bound 95% confidence level flow rate, which USGS attempted to convince DOE to fund, but were refused funding.

6. No credible empirical rationale can be presented to define the 100 year flood zone based on the plotting of the mean flow rate as DOE and the regulators are doing.

7. Given that the upper bound 95% confidence level flow rate is nearly twice what the mean flow rate is a significant spread and a percentage of error should have been provided.

            [8. If the upper bound 95% confidence level flow rate were used the topographic map might indicate more structures at INEEL which would fall within the floodplain.]  

 

            The apparent top of the ICDF berm is about 10 feet above the USGS plotted mean of the 100 year flood at INTEC.  Absent a through USGS study that plots the upper level flow rate and the resultant flooding given the near level topography of the INTEC environs, there is a lot of uncertainty about whether the berm is high enough. 

            Additional uncertainty is the ability of the berm to survive the three-feet-per-second rush of the flood and the erosion that would be expected to occur.  [36]

            The ten-foot berm would also be expected to erode over time from natural wind and precipitation which would eliminate that minimal flood barrier.  Who is going to be around in 200 years to maintain that berm?  If the berm was breached, is the liner adequate to maintain integrity with a hydriodic head of nearly 50 feet? 

            Five-hundred-year flood MEAN is estimated at 9,600 cfs.....Claims of 1,000 year durability of ICDF mandates inclusion of the 500-year flood impact, cascading event of Mackay Dam.....++ 54,000 cfs.

            Cost benefit analysis did not take into account long-term impact on the potential further contamination of the sole source Snake River Aquifer and how it would affect health and safety not to mention agriculture.

            The debris processing facility action is a critical action as defined by 1022.4 ( c) involving highly volatile, toxic or water reactive materials in the flood-plain.  The critical action flood-plain is defined as the 500-year (0.2 percent) flood-plain.  No 500-year flood analysis has been performed for the Debris Processing facility or for the other facilities housed within or near to CPP-659/1659, such as the Tank Farm, Process Equipment Waste Evaporator and the High Level Liquid Waste Evaporator.

            No adequate NEPA or 10 CFR 1022 environmental analysis exists for flood-plain issues which would link the Debris Processing Facility to the hazards associated with flood-plain issues which could cause failure at other facilities at INTEC including, but not limited to, facilities such as the tank farm facility (floating of 300,000 gallon tanks) and the New Waste Calciner Facility calcine bin sets.   SPERT-III and SPERT-IV overland flow analyses are not complete (in internal review) and available for public review (IDEQ/INEEL Quarterly Meeting June 8, 2000- Neil C. Hutten). 

            The public is entitled to consider flood-plain issues related to the Debris Processing facility in relation to the above or other facilities, such as the Liquid Effluent Treatment and Disposal facility, Process Equipment Waste Evaporator and the High Level Liquid Waste Evaporator.  The new INTEC waste percolation  ponds and the ICDF landfill in the flood zone may also receive some of the Debris Process facility effluent. 

            Yet another example of INTEC operations that affect the Debris permit flood vulnerability is the underground reactor fuel storage that if flooded could cause a criticality compromising CPP-659/1659 operations.

            Spent nuclear reactor fuel  in ICPP-749 Underground “Dry” Storage Facility has 78.40 metric tons heavy metal (MTHM) (not to be confused with the actual weight of the fuel)  in 218 underground dry vaults, built between 1971 and 1987. One hundred twenty-eight of the 218 dry vaults contain fuel from Peach Bottom Core I and the Fermi Blanket stored in aluminum canisters.  The carbon steel liners of the 61 first generation vaults have undergone significant corrosion due to seepage of moisture.  Fifty-nine of these vaults contain fuel in aluminum canisters.  Some of these canisters have been inspected and show moderate corrosion.  Gas samples show some canisters may be breached but there is no current indication of failed fuel clad.  Water that collects in these vaults may leak to ground.  The dry well design offers limited confinement capabilities, since it must be opened during fuel handling and inspection.  A significant hazard associated with the first generation wells is the potential for carbide-water reactions.  If the fuel is damaged and water is allowed to contact it, the carbide-bearing fuels could react exothermally with water to produce acetylene and oxygen.  Acetylene together with oxygen forms an explosive mixture.[DOE(a)]  Other 1994 inspections found degraded Peach Bottom fuel and degrading aluminum fuel cans and baskets at ICPP-749. [SNF Vulnerability]

            The following table showing spent fuel storage inventories are expressed in metric tons heavy metal (MTHM), which means only the weight of the plutonium, uranium, and thorium in the fuel is noted.  This MTHM nomenclature is new (post-1994) to DOE since previous fuel inventories were expressed in total mass  (i.e. weight of fuel element fissile material, cladding and end caps).  DOE’s stated reason for this change in nomenclature is that it more accurately describes the hazardous constituents.  Notwithstanding the usefulness of the MTHM number, all parts (i.e.. entire assembly) of the fuel represents a significant hazard, and therefore the total mass number should be predominately used because it more accurately describes the total hazard.  Inventories of spent nuclear fuel can be expressed with at least six different nomenclatures.  In addition to the previously discussed MTHM and total mass, there are volume, number of storage units, uranium mass, fissile mass.  Of the total (1,373 cubic meters) spent nuclear fuel volume held by DOE, INEEL has 53.5%.

Of the total (78 metric tons) spent nuclear fuel fissile mass held by DOE, INEEL has 49.9%. [Hoskins 7/11/94]                                  

            The HLWEIS page c.4-28 states:   “A major flood can cause damage to the facility structure and subsequent equipment failures, thereby causing a release of materials from the facility to the environment.  In particular, [calcine] bin set # 1 has been determined, by analysis, to be statically unstable.  Under flood conditions, the berm surrounding bin set # 1 could be undermined with subsequent collapse of the cover onto the four internal vaults.  Material released from the vaults would then be transported by flood waters to the surrounding area and released to the environment as dust once the flood recedes.  Early predictions of the frequency of such a flood were 1.0 x 10 (-4) at a maximum elevation of 4916.6 feet mean sea level well above the 4912 feet needed to wet the bottom of the bin set # 1 berm.” No arguments have been made that preclude the 1.0 x 10(-4) from being an upper bound.”

            Decades of Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) use of the Snake River Aquifer as a cesspool for radioactive and chemical waste disposal has resulted in contamination of this sole water source that sustains over 200,000 Idahoans. INEEL and its contractor Bechtel thumb their noses at regulations prohibiting this illegal activity, and state and federal environmental regulators sit on their collective hands. A recent scientific report by the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER) states: “Nuclear waste dumped at INEEL is polluting the Snake River Plain Aquifer, the primary source of drinking water for 200,000 people...”  According to this IEER report, plutonium from INEEL has migrated into the aquifer at levels of 24 pico curies per liter (pc/L) when the EPA MCL limit is 15 pC/L. [37] 

            An example of continued violations at INEEL are confirmed in a recent internal Department of Energy Headquarters safety report that acknowledges that two million gallons per day of hazardous chemical and radioactive waste water is being dumped into old unlined percolation ponds that are on the Superfund cleanup list. These ponds (also used by CPP-659) have been in use for decades despite the fact that they  contaminate the underlying Snake River sole source aquifer with radioactive plutonium, iodine, strontium, cesium, and tritium, in addition to a vast array of toxic chemicals and heavy metals like mercury. [DOE/ID10660@5-6]

            Regulators, in the INTEC CERCLA (Operable Unit 3-13) Record Of Decision told INEEL to stop using the percolation ponds by December 2003  because the water leaches contaminates in the underlying soil column down to the aquifer. This aquifer pollution significantly exceeds EPA's drinking water standards. Despite this, regulators granted INEEL a dumping extension to the year 2004 without any public notice or opportunity for public comment. This is a violation of the Resource Conservation Recovery Act and the Clean Water Act.

            Two of these old percolation ponds are located at INEEL Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP), now called INTEC, operated for INEEL by Bechtel BBWI Idaho. DOE Headquarters Report states: "INTEC continues to discharge about two million gallons of liquid effluents per day to the existing contaminated soil column under the percolation pond. These ongoing discharges are contrary to DOE Order 5400.5 paragraph 3.c.(2), which states that liquid discharges, even though uncontaminated, are prohibited in inactive release areas [i.e. old peculation ponds] to prevent the further spread of radionuclides previously deposited." [38]       [DOE@25]     

            Dumping two million gallons per day for three more years in the old   percolation pond amounts to about 2.19 billion gallons of waste water that could flush most of the contaminants in the soil column down to the aquifer and then Bechtel can claim they no longer need to clean up the site because the contaminate levels are below regulatory concern.  In fact, the ICPP Remediation Record of Decision stipulates that the  contaminated sediments are not to be exhumed but simply covered over and capped. [DOE/ID-10660@iv]

            As reported in Energy Daily by George Lobsenz: "INEEL officials had evaluated a closed-loop system for handling service water effluent, but concluded the cost of increased evaporation efforts and other measures was prohibitive-on the order of $830 million." INEEL contractors are paid to pollute, they’re paid bonuses when cost cutting measures increase  pollution, and finally, they are paid to clean  up the mess they created in the first place.

            Another internal INEEL report acknowledges illegal dumping in the old ICPP Percolation Ponds from the spent nuclear fuel storage pool filter system back flushes.  This process cleans contaminates filtered out of the A “demineralized” coolant water in the storage pools.  DOE’s solution is to dilute the waste water so it does not appear to be a regulatory violation, even though the agency knows full well that dilution of a hazardous waste is a violation of the Resource Conservation Recovery Act.  The Environmental Compliance Report states:  

            An effluent from regeneration of the ICPP [spent fuel storage pools] demineralizer system has not been adequately characterized to determine compliance with the [Land Disposal Regulations] LDR for underlying hazardous constituents (UHCs) [40 CFR 268.40(e)].  Since the demineralizer regeneration process creates D002 wastes, which are de-characterized through an elementary neutralization process [dilution] the effluent must be characterized for UHCs, which could be reasonably expected to be present in the waste.  The effluent is discharged to the CPP Percolation Ponds. The sampling and analysis plan is currently out for review.  In addition, the facility does not have a one-time LDR notification/certification [40 CFR 268.7 & 268.9(d)]. [pg. 2.2-25]

            Facilities  requiring [Wastewater Land Application Permits] WLAPs must be operated in accordance with the WLP regulations, permit applications, and operation and maintenance (O&M) manuals whether or not permits have been issued.  Identified issues include the following: leaks and potential leaks in pond liners, wastewater lines, sumps and basins; inadequate controls to prevent improper discharge of hazardous or radiological substances to the WLAP facilities; and inadequate programs to ensure consistent operation, monitoring, and maintenance at WLAP facilities in accordance with permit requirements.  Operational and maintenance concerns associated with inadequate operator training on O&M manual and permit requirements and inadequate maintenance of equipment were also identified. [2.4-3]

            In violation of the law under IDEQ’s nose, INEEL is building new unlined percolation ponds for use by 2004 to replace the old ones even though that violates a 1993 DOE Headquarters Order [5400.5] prohibiting the use of percolation ponds. The DOE/HQ safety report notes that INEEL management is not demonstrating any credible assurances that the new percolation pond will not be used for the same contaminate disposal as the old pond and thus create a new Superfund site. The DOE/HQ reports states:

"...the risks of contaminating a new soil column due to inadvertent contamination of this water have not been thoroughly reviewed or mitigated. There is a potential for service water to contaminate a soil column, which would require future environmental remediation Radioactively contaminated water is known to be inadvertently discharged through the service waste system. In addition, a small amount of residual contamination will remain in the lines following connection to the new percolation pond, and thus the discharges will continue to contain small concentrations of some radionuclides. Further, unmonitored release of radioactivity below the set point of process monitors could go undetected for a considerable periods (up to 60 days based on the monthly sampling frequency for service waste system discharges and the time required for analysis of samples), possibly contaminating a soil column."

            Yet another looming problem with continued use of new percolation ponds is the "recharge" to the existing contaminate plumes under and south of the ICPP. The Environmental Defense Institute (EDI) has learned that the "approximate" location of the new percolation ponds is about two miles southwest of the ICPP along the south bank of the Big Lost River. [ROD@11-24] It appears that the new percolation ponds are directly above the existing heavily contaminated aquifer plumes created by both the ICPP and the Test Reactor Area dumping in injection wells and percolation ponds. [ROD@1-9] Recharge to these plumes of contaminated water in the perched water and deep aquifer generates hydraulic pressure that drives the pollution deeper into the aquifer and further south toward the Magic Valley. Even if the new percolation pond is not directly over the highly contaminated perched water zones it will surely migrate laterally within the interbeds to merge with the existing polluted water plumes and thus add to the hydraulic pressure to this highly contaminated water to the aquifer. An example is the merging of the Test Reactor Area plume to the northwest with the ICPP contaminate plumes. Despite what INEEL and state and EPA regulators say, groundwater contamination at any level will eventually end up in the aquifer. No self-respecting hydrologist will say, like EPA and State regulators are publicly claiming, that the contaminated perched water "dries up." Ground water does not "dry-up" it migrates from unsaturated to deeper saturated zones carrying the contamination with it.             Regardless of convergence of the polluted water plumes, INEEL’s adding to an already unconscionable contamination of the Snake River Aquifer must be stopped. The table below lists other wastewater sources from the ICPP. Any additional dumping from all sources flushes those contaminates further away from the site toward Idaho farms and homes. This represents a horrible legacy to leave future generations. This discussion is germane to CPP-659/1659 flood issues by virtue of the fact that if intentional discharges force the migration of contaminates, floods will only greatly exacerbate the problem.

  

 

Waste Water from ICPP Adding to Loading/Recharge of Snake River Plain Aquifer

Source

Volume (gal/yr)

 

Service Waste Water (To Injection Well and Percolation Ponds)

690,000,000

 

Sewage Treatment Ponds

14,974,228

 

Water System/ Waste Line Leaks

3,973,202

 

Landscape Irrigation (washing contamination off rock ground cover)

1,299,470

 

Process Waste Steam Condensate

1,668,327

 

Leaks from CPP-603 Reactor Fuel Storage Pools

49,275

[DOE/ID-10660@5-4] [DOE/ID-22168@19]

 

            Wells nearby at the Test Reactor Area register Tritium samples of 2,160,000 + 30,000 pCi/L. [DOE/ID-22129 @94] Plutonium-238 and 239/240 concentrations in the Aquifer ranged as high as 0.93 pCi/L and 0.51 respectively according to a 1999 USGS report. [DOE/ID-22159@51] These sample data from the USGS are considerably higher than DOE is recently publicly acknowledged 0.02 to 0.08 pCi/L.[Weapons Complex Monitor 3/19/01]

            Two USGS reports released in September and October of 2000 confirm that  continued use of ICPP injection wells for waste disposal leads directly into the aquifer as a major source of contamination. "The volumes of waste water discharged to the well and infiltration ponds during 1962-98 are shown in figure 10.”  The USGS report which states: "Routine use of disposal well discontinued, 1984, but does not quantify the continuing non-routine discharge rates to the injection well.  "Annual discharge to the well and ponds ranged from 260 million gallons in 1963 to 665 million gallons in 1993 and averaged about 442 million gallons. The average annual discharge during 1996-98 was about 570 million gallons."[DOE/ID-22168@19]

             Dumping in the injection well is also contaminating the perched water zones  due to leaks in the injection well casing. According to USGS; "Perched ground water [contamination] also has been identified ... and may be attributed to other infiltration ponds, leaking wastewater lines, leach fields, ruptured casing in the upper part of the INTEC deep disposal well and landscape irrigation." [DOE/ID-22168@19 and 22167@22]

             This USGS information challenges DOE's public statements that use of injection wells for waste disposal was discontinued in the mid 1980s. There are about thirteen waste injection wells on the INEEL site. Only one of the thirteen injection wells (CPP-23) was grouted closed in 1989; two injection wells at Power Burst Facility were capped. The other injection wells including CPP-50 remain usable presumably on a "non-routine" basis.

            One might speculate what would constitute a “A non-routine” or what DOE has called “An emergency”  use of the injection well where a process upset generated a waste stream that even after being diluted would set off radiation monitors once discharged to the percolation ponds.  Perhaps in the interest of worker exposure, DOE would consider it expedient to dump the hot waste down the injection well. There is little doubt that was the “logic” of using the injection wells in the first place.  “Out of sight, out of mind, and out of detection.”

            The State of Idaho and EPA must demand that all discharge lines to the injection wells be cut and capped.  The well heads must also be capped and locked so the well can only be used for monitoring or if needed a pump and treat operation to remove contaminates.

              INEEL’s “mainlining”  radioactive and chemical wastes directly into the aquifer justifiably outrages the public by continued use of percolation ponds and injection wells. What has come to the attention of Environmental Defense Institute is INEEL's use of "dilution is the solution for pollution" when one-tenth volume of contaminated process waste water is diluted by a nine-tenths volume of "clean" aquifer water before being dumping in the injection well or the percolation ponds. ICPP workers call it "flush water." Testing on the effluent occurs after dilution. This process of dilution is deliberate and constitutes an illegal effort to avoid regulatory restraints, which impose  contaminate concentration limits. The Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) specifically prohibits dilution because the drafters of the statutes understood the propensity of polluters to avoid regulations via dilution. [40 CFR 268.3] There are nine active percolation ponds at INEEL, and the most heavily used ones are at ICPP, Central Facilities Area, Test Reactor Area, and Test Area North.

 

Groundwater Sample Data Near ICPP

Contaminate

Snake River Aquifer (pCi/L)

Perched Water Well (pCi/L)

Water Standard (pCi/L)

 

Plutonium-238

0.93

-

<15

 

Plutonium-239/240

0.44

-

<15

 

Americium-241

0.54

0.16

<15

 

Iodine-129

3.82

-

1.0

 

Strontium-90

84.0

320,000

8.0

 

Technicum-99

448.0

740.0

900.0

 

Tritium

30,700

73,000

20,000

 

Uranium-234

2.6

12

15.0

 

Uranium-238

1.10

2.7

15.0

 

Gross Alpha

10.0

1,140

15.0

 

Gross Beta

469.0

590,000

4mR/yr

 

[DOE/ID-10660, OU-3-13, ROD @5-61 & 5-70] [DOE/ID-22159@51] [DOE/EIS-0287D @ 4-64][Pico Curie per Liter (pCi/L)]

  

                            Test Reactor Area Perched Ground Water Sample Data

Nuclide	Concentra­tion  pCi/L	EPA 1976  Standard pCi/L	Number Times over EPA Standard.
Cobalt-60	12,200,000	100.00	122,000.0
Zinc-65	105,000	300.00	350.0
Cesium-134	62,400	8.13*	7,675.0
Cesium-137	21,000,000	119.0*	176,470.0
Europium-152	108,000	60.00	1,800.0
Europium-154	130,000	200.00	650.0
Europium-155	20,400	600.00	34.0
Americium-241	16,700	6.34	2,634.0
Chromium-51	2,540,000	6,000.00	423.0
Iron-59	2,600	200.00	13.0
Zirconium-95	11,500	200.00	57.5
Niobium-95	12,000	300.00	40.0
Ruthenium-103	3,970	200.00	19.8
Rhodium-106	4,980	30.00	166.0
Silver-108	14,400	90.00	160.0
Cerium-141	6,140	300.00	20.4
Ytterbium-175	3,500	300.00	11.6
Hafnium-181	136,000	200.00	680.0
Tantalum-182	3,180	100.00	31.8
Plutonium-239	12	15.00	0
Uranium-234	520	13.9*	37.0
Strontium-90	18,000	8.00	2,250.0
Tritium	3,940,000	20,000.00	197.0

[DOE/IDEQ/EPA Record of Decision, 12/92 Test Reactor Area Perched Water System] [Administrative Record, TRA Summary Tables of Chemical and Radiological Analysis, Appendix G-484  and 485, Analytica-ID-12782-1 @ D-615 to D-632] [EPA-570/9-76-003][1976 EPA Standard MCL is the current rule, a new proposed rule has not been promulgated because it has been found not to be protective] *[FR-7/18/91 Proposed MCL] Expressed in Pico Curies per liter (pCi/L)

  

            The State of Idaho commissioned a limited study by Boise State University seismologist James Zollweg who found that “if a large earthquake struck, the biggest worry would be those tanks”. Zollweg’s assessment was endorsed by U.S. Geological Survey’s Larry Mann who said, “that would be a catastrophic release.  It couldn’t be intercepted before reaching the aquifer”.  Zollweg calculated that, “if an earthquake of 7 on the Richter scale hit the fault closest to the tanks, a ground acceleration of about 0.24 G could hit the vaults”. [Statesmen (b)]  A catastrophic risk exists with these forty-year-old tanks which DOE refuses to address.  The tanks are 400 feet above the Snake River Plain Aquifer that provides drinking water for over 275,000 Idahoans.  Scientists also believe that if the tanks fail, then the acids in the tanks will react with the concrete in the vaults and release large amounts of radioactive gases into the atmosphere.            DOE contends that a spare tank is available in the event a problem arises; waste can be transferred to the spare tank.  This contingency relies heavily on there being not more than one tank failure, that the service lines needed to pump out the failed tank remain intact,  that the pump capacity is sufficient to remove the waste in minutes, and that operators can respond quickly in a multiple event accident scenario.  DOE’s 1993 assessment shows that the tank service lines could not survive greater than 0.18 g and the pumps to transfer the waste to another tank can only deliver 50 gallons/minute. [DOE/EA-0831]  That means it would take 100 hours to transfer 300,000 gallons assuming the transfer lines survive.  This does not qualify as a credible rapid emergency response to prevent tank contents from leaking into the ground.

            Of particular concern is the long-term reliability of tanks WM-185, 187, and 188, whose corrosion rate is "definitely increas­ing". [ENICO-1131 @ 19]  The 9,000 feet of underground piping used in trans­fer of radioac­tive waste does not meet RCRA standards for continu­ous second­ary contain­ment.  Some lines are encased in concrete.  "The concrete encasement is found in the immediate vicinity of valve boxes and around about 5% of the underground piping." [Ibid. @ 2] According to the General Accounting Office these underground pipes have leaked substantial quantities of high-level waste to the ground. [GAO/RCED/91-56] Also in March 1962, two tanks dis­charged to their vaults due to poorly designed service lines. Twelve INEEL tank or waste line leaks are documented through 1976.  [ERDA-1536@­II-79] DOE is currently replacing some of these service lines.

            The tanks also do not meet Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) requirements for secondary containment of hazardous wastes. "A Notice of Noncompliance was issued on January 29, 1990 by the EPA because the secondary con­tainment (concrete vaults) is subject to attack by the acidic solutions stored in the tanks", and "the pillar and panel con­struction style of the vaults has insufficient seismic resistance." [Spent Fuel Plan @ 8&11]  [39]         Indeed, the 30,000 gal. tanks do not even have any vaults or secondary containment.  In 1995, these un-vaulted tanks were emptied and taken out of service.

            The vaulted tanks also support 10 feet of earth plus a 12,000 pound con­crete structure for radiation shielding of the vent pipes. That puts the bottom of the tank over 32 feet in the ground gener­ating considerable earth loads.  In an earth­quake scenar­io, a col­laps­ing vault would com­pound the stresses on the weak tanks and add to the likelihood of a total tank failure.  The integrity of the vaults and their ability to hold the tank contents if it ruptured is further chal­lenged because five of the 11 (300,0­00 gal.) tanks get water "in-leakage" that must be periodi­cally pumped out.­ [40] [ERDA-1536@II-79] 

            The State Oversight Program recently disclosed that an average of more than 2,400 gallons per month were pumped from the concrete vaults enclosing the high-level waste tanks.  This compares to a maximum of 100 gallons per year that normally would be expected to seep into the tank vaults. [Oversight 92 @ 17]  Another uncertainty is how much of the 2,400 gallons pumped out of the vaults is tank leakage and how much is ground/surface water migration into the vaults.

            "Major discrepancies were discovered between recorded volumes of water pumped from the aquifer for [ICPP] production use when compared with water used and disposed or lost from February 1990 to December 1990.  Approximately 20 million gallons were unaccounted for in June 1990 alone."...”Since 1988, water level in a perched body of water approximately 370 feet below the tank farm rose nearly six feet.  Measurements were taken in a well about 500 feet southwest of the tank farm."  [Oversight 92]     ERDA documents show a long history of tritium plume migration under the ICPP. In 1960 the plume registered 1,000,000 pCi/L and was expected to migrate 12 miles south of the boundary. [ERDA@III-69]    Significant spills and leaks have frequently occurred over INEEL's history.  "Most spills have been the result of line and tank failures, leaking valves, and equipment and tank overfill­ing.  [Spill and/or leak] volumes range up to 45,000 gal.." [DOE/EH/OEV-22-P,p.3-166]   DOE sources cite that high-level tank wastes can range in concentra­tion between 12,000 Ci/gal or 5 million Ci per batch  [IDO-14532 @18&23] to 25,000 Ci/gal. [IDO-14414]  One gallon is equal to 3.79 liters.  Converting the previous concentrations to metric would be 3,166.22 Ci/L and 6,596.3 Ci/L respectively. Plutonium concen­tra­tions can reach 30 milli­curie of alpha activity per liter. [Ibid @ 13]  There is no doubt that these figures characterize an extremely radioactive witches brew which when released to the environment via leaks represents a significant hazard.

           

                       

References (in addition to footnoted citations):

 

US Department of Energy, Office of Independent Environmental Health and Safety Oversight, Focused Safety Management Evaluation of INEEL, January, 2001. Reference to DOE Order 5400.5 is the Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment Order relating to phasing out existing soil column discharges at DOE sites.

DOE/ID-22168; Distribution of Selected Radiochemical and Chemical Constituents in Perched Ground Water, INEEL, Idaho, 1996-98, U.S. Geological Survey Water Resources Investigations Report 00-4222, October 2000

DOE/ID-22167; Hydrologic Conditions and Distribution of Selected Constituents in Water, Snake River Plain Aquifer, INEEL, Idaho 1996 through 1998, U.S. Geological Survey, Water Resources Investigations Report 00-4192, September 2000.

DOE/ID-22159; Chemical Constituents in Ground Water from 39 Selected Sites with an Evaluation of Associated Quality Assurance Data, INEEL and Vicinity, Idaho, U.S. Geological Survey Open File Report 99-246, August 1999.

DOE/ID-10660; Final Record of Decision, Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center, Operable Unit 3-13, October 1999. Also referred to as "ROD" above.

INEL-96/0389, Environmental Compliance Inventory of the INEL, Volume I ECI Results December 1996, INEL-96/0389, Lockheed Martin.

 

             EDI would like to acknowledge technical contribution and review by David McCoy in the preparation of this Amicus Brief.

           

            Respectfully Submitted

 

 

Chuck Broscious

Executive Director

Environmental Defense Institute                                               

 

 

Attachment A

 

David McCoy Appellant Brief (January 11, 2002)

Note that the attachments to the McCoy brief are not included here but are available upon request

 

Endnotes