Environmental Defense Institute
Troy, Idaho 83871-0220
July 11, 2003
C. Stephen Allred, Director
Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, ID 83706-1255
Sent via US Certified mail,
and
Sent via Email to:
SALLRED@DEQ.STATE.ID.US
Charles McCollum,
Administrator
EPA Office of Inspector
General
Sacramento Audit Office
801 “I” St #264
Sacramento, CA 95814
Sent via Email to: mccollum.charles@epa.gov
Kwai Chan, Assistant
Inspector General
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Av.
Washington, DC 20460
Sent via Email to: chan.kwai@epamail.epa.gov
Darryl Early, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, ID83706-1255
Sent via Email to:
DEARLY@DEQ.STATE.ID.US
Brian Monson
Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, ID83706-1255
Sent via Email to:
BMONSON@DEQ.STATE.ID.US
RE: REQUEST TO IDEQ TO
REVOKE INEEL TANK FARM CLOSURE PERMITS
Dear Sirs,
On April 18, 2002 the
Environmental Defense Institute (EDI) and David McCoy sent you gentlemen a
formal “request for investigation of the INEEL Tank Farm Closure Issues.” See Attachment A. Again, on May 28, 2002, EDI and McCoy sent a formal request to
the Chair Person, Board of the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, and
Kwai Chan, Assistant Inspector General of the US Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA/IG). See Attachment B.
Neither request apparently resulted in any substantive response to the
essential issues.
Given the recent U.S.
District Court judgement in NRDC vs. DOE,
Case No. 01-CV.413 (BLW), the HWMA/RCRA Partial Closure Plan Permit for
Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Complex (INTEC) WM-182 and WM-183 Tank
Systems must be revoked. In addition to
Judge Winmill’s decision in the above cited case, we offer in Attachment C,
NRDC’s August 22, 2002 legal analysis letter to DOJ/DOE to substantiate our
request. We note that the reason the
NRDC suit was brought was to prevent precisely the type of tank closure that
DOE proposed and which IDEQ has authorized.
Therefore, we again renew our
formal request that the above permit be revoked. Judge Winmill’s Memorandum
Decision states: “Thus, DOE’s Order 435.1 must be declared invalid under Chevron.
The Court will therefore grant NRDC’s motion for summary judgement and deny
DOE’s cross motion [for dismissal].” [page 12]
EDI acknowledges receipt of
IDEQ letters (4/16/02) and (5/22/02) to EDI, however IDEQ chose to characterize
these requests solely as “Public Information Requests” and categorically ignore
the fundamental request of the tank closure permit request.
Additionally, we request, in
view of the court ruling, a review of the IDEQ Closure Permit for the INTEC
Waste Calcine Facility [Docket # 10HW0305] and related tanks containing
high-level waste as defined by the 7/3/03 U.S. District Court Decision that
states in pertinent part: “... the solids sink to the bottom, forming a sludge,
leaving the liquids on top. This
physical separation is analogous to the NWPA’s definition for separation: The
liquid and solids are treated differently by the Act. While NWPA allows DOE to
treat the solids to remove fission products, thereby permitting
reclassification of the waste, NWPA does not offer the option of
reclassification for liquid waste produced directly in reprocessing.” [page 10]
Judge Winmill’s decision therefore applies to all INEEL tanks containing
high-level waste. The wastes that are from reprocessing are not to be left in any
of the tanks at INEEL and merely grouted.
We note that the NRDC
decision should be applied to the tanks associated with the Waste Calcine
Facility (“WCF”), the New Waste Calciner Facility (“NWCF”), including but not
limited to the Calciner itself and the tanks for the High Level Liquid Waste Evaporator. The contents of these tanks should be slated
for RCRA clean closure and removal from the state of Idaho and not allowed to
enter into the CERCLA process.
Sincerely,
Chuck Broscious, Executive
Director
Environmental Defense
Institute
P. O. Box 220
Troy, ID 83871-0220
208-835-6152
edinst@tds.net
David B. McCoy
2940 Redbarn Lane
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
208 -542-1449
Attachment A: April 18, 2002 letter from Environmental Defense
Institute and David McCoy to
C.
Stephen Allred, et al. Available only in US mail to Mr. Allred and email to
principals.
Attachment B:
May 28, 2002 letter from Environmental Defense Institute and David McCoy to
Chair
Person, Board of the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, et al..
Available
only in US Mail to Mr. Allred and email to principals
Attachment C:
Natural Resources Defense Council, Geoffrey Fettus letter to Barry Weiner,
Trial
Attorney for U.S. Department of Justice,
August 22, 2002. Available only in original US mail to Mr. Allred.. For a faxed
copy contact EDI.
cc: Tom Patricelli, Keep
Yellowstone Nuclear Free, via email.
Geoffrey Fettus, Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense
Council, via email.
Michael Owen, EPA/IG Seattle, via email
Jeff Hunt, EPA Region X, via email
Attachment A
April 18, 2002
C. Stephen Allred, Director
Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, ID83706-1255
Sent via Email to:
SALLRED@DEQ.STATE.ID.US
Charles McCollum,
Administrator
EPA Office of Inspector
General
Sacramento Audit Office
801 “I” St #264
Sacramento, CA 95814
Sent via Email to: mccollum.charles@epa.gov
Darryl Early, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, ID83706-1255
Sent via Email to:
DEARLY@DEQ.STATE.ID.US
Brian Monson
Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, ID83706-1255
Sent via Email to:
BMONSON@DEQ.STATE.ID.US
RE: REQUEST FOR
INVESTIGATION OF INEEL TANK FARM CLOSURE ISSUES
Dear Sirs,
Attached is a computer document regarding tank farm
closure which was taken off the internal DOE INEEL Internet and furnished to
McCoy by a concerned INEEL employee. The original MS Word version is included
as Attachment A for validation. The
document addresses problems, some of which are briefly described below, and
then the problems appear to be deliberately word crafted in order to “resolve,”
disguise or hide technical or legal issues from Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality (IDEQ) as the regulator.
Additionally, we have enclosed, as Attachment B, the 2/02 Natural Resource Defense Council Complaint
in US Federal Court for the State of Idaho. This complaint asks the court to
make a determination on the fundamental issue of DOE’s legal right to unilaterally
change the classification of radioactive waste in alleged violation of the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act (42 U.S.C. § 10101).
The Environmental Defense Institute and McCoy are making
a formal request for an investigation by EPA and IDEQ into (1) tank closure
issues presented in this document and (2) what appears to be a calculated
effort by the Department of Energy (DOE) to mislead IDEQ about closure issues
related to the Tank Farm Closure and the INTEC Tank Farm Facility Incidental
Waste Study Final (90% Final). While we
lack these specific external document(s) that the comments refer to, it seems
that the comments are designed to throw IDEQ off the track of numerous
issues. This document will provide IDEQ
an opportunity to look at tank farm closure information from DOE, which may
have been subsequently provided to IDEQ, from another perspective. Idaho needs more than “slick” and devious
answers for the problems listed below in order for the Department of Energy to
protect the human environment.
Grouting comments- the attached internal INEEL
document indicates comments in numerous sections that grouting cannot be
appropriately accomplished because (1) the tanks sit on a sand bed; (2)
grouting under the tanks will be necessary, but the grouting of the non-RCRA
compliant concrete tank vault containment structures will float the tanks and
bend and distort the tank bottoms so that the grouting may bend or break the
wastes grouted inside the tanks so that the waste will not be immobilized; and
(3) there will not be any homogenous mixture formed within the tanks between
the grout and the wastes; (4) the side panels and side walls and floors of the
vaults are contaminated with radioactive and mixed (RCRA) wastes; (5) Vessel
Offgas Systems (VOG) problems are avoided as “outside the scope of this study”;
(6) nine out of eleven tanks do not meet seismic criteria. The report shows
that mixing of the grout and the tank sediments will not occur. The displacement grout will simply “roll
over” the solids, leaving potential HLW, (TRU), or > class C Low Level Waste
at the tank bottoms which is not immobilized.
Comments indicate that adequate hydraulic studies have not been
performed.
One comment states “ SINCE THE NEW GROUT IN THE VAULT
WILL NOT TRAVEL UNDER THE TANKS AND 9 OF THEM SIT ON SAND, WILL THIS BE A
PROBLEM WHEN THE REGULATORS SEE IT OR SHOULD WE SAY RIGHT NOW THAT THE SAND
WILL BE CONTAINED BY THE GROUT AND THE OLD FLOOR AND THEREFORE ANY WASTE OR
LEAKAGE WILL BE CONTAINED. OR SOMETHING
SIMILAR TO THIS.” Another commenter
states, “The grout will roll over the solids.” Another commenter states, “The grout will not encase the solids,
they will sandwich them between the grout and the bottom of the tank. Underneath the tank is sand. Under the sand is the existing tank
vault. The vault has been proven to
leak from the infiltration of rainwater.”
The clear indication of these comments is that Idaho will not be
protected by grouting from the High Level Waste contained in the tanks.
Numerous comments address problems which exist respecting
how to “wash down” the tanks, i.e., removal of solids from the tanks by the use
of a “mixing pump”. No backup plan
exists for solids removals from the tanks in case the mixing pump plan doesn’t
work. The mixing pump will not likely
be sufficient to remove a significant fraction of the potential solids. There is no backup for solids removal from
the tanks in case the mixing pump plan doesn’t work. The mixing pump will not
likely be sufficient to remove a significant fraction of the potential solids
and the mixing pump design has not been established. One commenter states in part, “This clean/wash/rinse activity
will have little or no effect on the chemical composition of the solids since
they are insoluble even in 2-3 molar nitric acid. This activity may or may not physically move the solids inside
the tank or remove them from the tank.
This clean/wash/rinse activity may also have little effect on the liquid
SBW [Sodium Bearing Waste] held interstitially by the solids depending on the
turbulence involved.”
The lack of a
mixing pump design comment is resolved by stating that “Establishing the actual
agitation and mixing effectiveness is beyond the scope of this study.”
Commenters state that double containment should be
required by IDEQ. The existing concrete vaults do not qualify
with the double containment required by RCRA.
A reference in the document was deliberately deleted to
avoid the problems about 30,000 gallon tanks which sit on a gravel bed. Any liquid that might accumulate on top of
the grout is handled as “being beyond the scope of work for this study.” None of the tanks initially passed a seismic
analysis and analyses have not been performed.
Corrosion rates may be well beyond design value for INTEC liquid waste
storage tanks.
Comments in the document also disclose that the grout
will not commingle/mix with the tank heels and therefore will not meet any of
the EPA Land Disposal Regulations applicable to this waste even for deep
geologic burial (i.e. WIPP/WAC)
Contaminated vaults- “unknown leaks.” Contaminated
soils from transfer line leaks may be radioactive mixed waste. There may be existing bedrock contamination
from the transfer line leaks having migrated to the perched water below ICPP.
No Compliance with DOE Order 435.1-- according to
attached document, requirements for TRU waste cannot be met or may be
“impractical” in the context of HLW facility closure. Sodium Bearing Waste (SBW) is not to be called “HLW.” A statement that “the TFF (Tank Farm
Facility) CURRENTLY contains HLW” ...conflicts with the official position of
the HLW program that we no longer have any liquid HLW at the Chem Plant.”
Several comments address the inadequate characterization
of the heels (tank sediments) which contain high concentrations of
transuranics. Plutonium and other waste levels are greater than the land
disposal requirements for Class C Low-level Waste (CCLLW). [Also, see NRDC
Complaint that alleges 2 to 20 times increased nuclides in high-level waste in
the tank heels due to settlement in the heels. (p. 19)]. One commenter states,
“Class C chemical compositions might be difficult to achieve; Class C physical
performance parameters most likely would be impossible to achieve especially
in-tank and demonstrated/proved in tank ... I suggest that since [DOE Order]
435.1 is still in the draft form that a strong message be sent from Idaho that
it is unworkable, that it is overkill, that it will just cause another
requirements logjam.” Another
commenter states “... DOE Headquarters staff working on Order 435.1 were
advised that strict adherence to the requirements for TRU waste disposal (e.g.,
compliance with 40 CFR191) may be impractical in the context of HLW facility
closure ...” Another commenter states,
“There is a fair chance that the heel residues will be TRU waste after
cleaning. Does this change any of the
disposition plans? This is not dealt
with through-out the document.”
There is lack of RCRA compliant tanks to recycle process
liquids before 2012. Shielding
requirements have not been calculated but were only estimated based on the old
tank farm and similar facilities. Bias
may be present in vacuum sampling of RCRA organics.
The above are some of the obvious issues contained in
this document which IDEQ should require DOE to clearly address instead of
playing deceptive word games to deflect honest concerns with the future health
and safety of Idaho. We agree with the
words of one commenter (concerned about sampling problems) who stated, “Don’t we
care about what we are leaving rather than proving our past history?”
We would appreciate your respective agencies looking into
this matter and informing us of your findings and notification of all Tank
Closure Plans. Please add this request
for an investigation and the attached computer documents as comments to tank
closure proceedings in process.
Sincerely,
Chuck Broscious, Executive
Director
Environmental Defense
Institute
P. O. Box 220
Troy, ID 83871-0220
208-835-6152
David B. McCoy
2940 Redbarn Lane
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
208 -542-1449
cc: sent via Email:
Dirk Kempthorne, Governor
Jeff Hunt, EPA Region 10
Katherine Thompson, EPA/OIG
Attachment A: Tank Farm Closure document (Tank Farm Leak)
Attachment B: NRDC v. USDOE Complaint (435.1
Complaintfinal); 435.1 Brief 5-21-00; 435.1 Reply Brief)
Attachment B
May 28, 2002
Chair Person, Board of the
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality
Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, Boise, ID83706-1255
Sent via US Mail
C. Stephen Allred, Director
Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, Boise,
ID83706-1255
Sent via Email to:
SALLRED@DEQ.STATE.ID.US
Kwai Chan, Assistant
Inspector General
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Av.
Washington, DC 20460
Sent via Email to: chan.kwai@epamail.epa.gov
Charles McCollum,
Administrator
EPA Office of Inspector
General
Sacramento Audit Office, 801
“I” St #264
Sacramento, CA 95814
Sent via Email to: mccollum.charles@epa.gov
Darryl Early, Esq., Assistant
Attorney General
Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, Boise,
ID83706-1255
Sent via Email to:
DEARLY@DEQ.STATE.ID.US
Brian Monson
Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, Boise,
ID83706-1255
Sent via Email to:
BMONSON@DEQ.STATE.ID.US
RE: 1) RESPONSE TO IDEQ
REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION OF INEEL TANK
FARM CLOSURE ISSUES AND PETITION TO REOPEN
TANK FARM FOR EXTENDED PUBLIC COMMENT (40 CFR 124.10 AND 124.14) AND
2) REQUEST FOR
PUBLIC INFORMATION.
Dear Sirs,
Thank you for your letter of response dated 5/10/02 to
our request for an investigation of the INEEL high-level waste tank closure
plan. The following is an email from INEEL EM Information specialist that
states, “The closure plan is not yet available. The Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality is responsible for releasing it for the public comment
period. I would suggest contacting someone over there. Thanks...Stacey Francis, EM
Communications.” EDI has made
additional requests (5/18/02) to IDEQ’s website information designee (T.
Gregory and PIR official Jason Jedry) for a copy of the Tank Closure Plan with
no response to date. Clearly, this
important document is not readily available to the public, and therefore the
public can not make an informed determination on the proposed plan.
The Environmental Defense Institute received via a Public
Information Request, a tank closure plan report dated 12/00 (DOE/ID-10802
Revision O), however there is no way of knowing if this is the report relied on
for the IDEQ RCRA/HWMA Permit Docket No. 10HW-0204. The Closure Plan in EDI’s possession contains all the vague,
obfuscating text contained in the INEEL internal tank closure plan comment
document sent to IDEQ via email despite the specific objection of INEEL
technical experts. [See Attachment A below]
The essential disclosure information was systematically excised from the
12/00 report .
The Tank Closure Plan violates 40 CFR 191 for disposing
mixed high-level radioactive waste in near surface internment that can not meet
the 10,000 year minimum requirement.
The Tank Closure Plan violates 40 CFR 265.112(b)(4) that
states in pertinent part, “A detailed description of the steps needed to remove
or decontaminate all hazardous waste residues and contaminated
containment system components, equipment, structures, and soils during partial
and final closure including, but not limited to, procedures for cleaning
equipment and removing contaminated soils, methods for sampling and testing
surrounding soils, and criteria for determining the extent of decontamination
necessary to satisfy the closure performance standard.” (Emphasis added). And
Subpart J--Tank Systems 40 CFR Sec. 265.197(a)
Closure and post-closure care states “ At closure of a tank system, the
owner or operator must remove or decontaminate all waste residues,
contaminated containment system components (liners, etc.), contaminated soils,
and structures and equipment contaminated with waste, and manage them as hazardous
waste.” [Emphasis added]
The State of Idaho and EPA regulators are thrusting a
“Risk-Based” closure plan that has a multitude of questionable assumptions
without supporting sampling data, and specific limits on tank heels left in
place, all of which are not fully disclosed. Specifically, how much tank heel
will be left in the tanks and grouted over in order to meet the “Risk Based” no
harm criteria?
Even more egregious is that DOE technology development
that currently exists that can remove nearly all the tank sediments, yet for
cost cutting measures has not been implemented [1]
Fundamentally, Petitioners allege that what easily
exhume-able mixed hazardous high-level waste from the INTEC tanks will be sent
to other un-RCRA permitted treatment, storage, disposal (TSD) at INTEC (i.e.,
High-level Liquid Waste Evaporator (HLLWE), Process Equipment Waste Evaporator
(PEWE), and the Liquid Effluent Treatment and Disposal (LET&D). This is illegal!
As Petitioners requesting reopening or extension of the
period for public comment pursuant to 40 CFR 124.10 and 124.14 for information
that raises substantial new questions related to DOE to properly close High
Level Waste Tanks, we object to your determination that: “Based on our review
of your submittal, the DEQ remains confident that the plan for moving forward
with the Closure of the first two of eleven Tank Farm Facility (TFF) tanks is
compliant with HWMA regulations, and it represents full disclosure on the part
of DOE to address the operational realities associated with closure of the
mixed waste tanks.” This statement fails to address the various crucial legal
issues Petitioners presented in our “Request for Investigation” some of which
include:
1. Decontamination steam jets do not have the capacity (according to INEEL experts) to remove the solids in the tank heels, therefore leaving about 30,000 gallons of mixed high-level waste sediments in the two tanks;
2. Decontamination water/steam jet sprays will not resuspend the heel solids nor remove hazardous heavy metal waste because as INEEL experts pointed out they are precipitates of a < 2 mole acidic raffinate;
3. Grout will not mix with the tank heels which violates the RCRA and EPA’s Land Disposal Restrictions;
4. Grout will only “roll over tank heels” and sandwich them between the tank bottom, and required sampling of the final waste form to validate encapsulation is not planned or technically possible as identified by INEEL expert’s comments;
5. Grouting of the vault completely under the tank is believed by INEEL’s own engineers as impossible, yet the Closure Plan nonetheless assumes it, which in turn invalidates the Plan’s Risk Assessment assumptions, and fate and transport modeling;
6. The “Risk-based Clean Closure” does not offer sampling data to specify the minimum amount of tank heels that will be left in the tanks to satisfy the this criteria.
7. Grouting of the tanks sumps will only partially “float” the tanks causing deformation and possible breaching of the fifty-year-old tanks.
8. Closure Plan Risk Assessment fails to include 400 rem/hr soil contaminate loading for cesium-137 (102 million picocuries/gram), strontium-90 (56.8 million pCi/g), and plutonium (276 nano curies per gram) that are the result of tank vault and service line leaks as required in 40 CFR 265.111;
9. Tanks WM-182 and 183 history shows aluminum and zirconium reactor fuel reprocessing raffinate up until 1993 and 1997 respectively that produced the solid high-level waste precipitate in the tank heels. Sodium bearing liquid waste was only subsequently added after these dates, therefore DOE’s claim to strictly SBW with respect to the tank heels is bogus;
10. Tank heel solids (raffinate precipitates) are mixed high-level waste by definition (42 USC 10101 et.seq. and therefore cannot be legally disposed in shallow land burial as designated in the Tank Closure Plan’s “Landfill Closure Plan”. Also see : (40 CFR191 Disposal of High-level Waste) and (Nuclear Waste Policy Act at 42 USC ss 701 et seq.);
11. Risk-Based assessment fails to include the fact that the tanks are some forty feet below the 100-year flood plain of the Big Lost River and the leaching effect of contaminated soil, tank vaults, and tank contents into the Snake River Plain Aquifer. Disposal of hazardous waste is also prohibited by RCRA in a flood plain;
12. The tanks have leaked reactor fuel reprocess waste (according to INEEL experts) into the tank vaults thereby extensively contaminating the concrete vault floor and sides, which was not factored into the Risk Assessment as part of the contaminate loading factors in the fate and transport modeling..
Public Request for Information
Pursuant to the Idaho Public
Information Statute the following documents are requested in relation to the
INTEC WM-182 & 183 Tank Closure Plan issues including, but not limited to,
items 1 through 11 in the above paragraph which were presented to the IDEQ for
investigation.
1.
Provide copies of all written documents which were reviewed by
IDEQ.
2.
Provide copies of all written or electronic memoranda, computer generated,
E-mail, notes of any IDEQ personnel who investigated or researched the Tank
Closure document furnished to IDEQ.
3.
Provide copies of all documents which were requested by or utilized by
IDEQ or furnished to IDEQ by any agency in relation to the Tank Closure plan.
4.
Provide all notices of deficiency that IDEQ has sent to DOE regarding
the Tank Closure Plan.
5.
Provide all copies of the DOE tank closure plan which contain margin
notes by IDEQ staff.
6.
Provide telephone logs and any electronic documents, notes, E-mail, tape
recordings or any other records of communication between any persons at the
Department of Energy that IDEQ interviewed for the Tank Closure
investigation.
7.
Provide any copies of written or electronic memoranda, notes, E-mail or
other records of communication between the IDEQ and Governor Dirk Kempthorne or
his officers and the IDEQ regarding the Tank Closure investigation.
8.
Provide any documentation for specific factual issues which IDEQ
addressed for its Tank Closure investigation.
9.
Provide any records of findings in relation to issues in item #8 in
relation to IDEQ’s Tank Closure investigation.
10. Provide a complete copy of the
internal Tank Closure comment document that was provided to your office by EDI
and David McCoy.
If you have any questions concerning
these issues, please feel free to contact us at the phone numbers identified on
the signatory page.
Sincerely,
___________________________________
Chuck
Broscious, Executive Director
Environmental
Defense Institute
P. O.
Box 220
Troy,
ID 83871-0220
208-835-6152
_________________________________
David
B. McCoy
2940
Redbarn Lane
Idaho
Falls, ID 83404
208
-542-1449
cc:
sent via Email:
Dirk
Kempthorne, Governor of Idaho
Jeff
Hunt, EPA Region 10
Katherine
Thompson, EPA/OIG
Attachment
A
Comments
by INEEL technical experts on 1.) INTEC Tank Closure Plan 90% Final; 2.) INTEC
New Liquid Waste Storage Tanks 90% Final; and 3.) Tank Farm 90% Incidental
Waste Study.
David Lord Mike Patterson Tom
Hipp
Dennis Harrell Vic
Jacobson John
McCrat
Cliff Olsen Mike Swenson Jim
Bosley
George Clarke Mark
VanSickel Frank Ward
Scott Jensen Bob James Veldon Archibold
Bryan Spalding Keith
Quiagley Jim Bosley
Max Christensen Vic
Jacobsen Dave
Ostby
Attachment
B
Energy
Daily Article
Ed,
4-29-2002, Lede
Headline:
Leaked DOE Documents Poke Holes In INEEL Waste Tank Cleanup Plan
BY
GEORGE LOBSENZ
In what could be damaging
revelations for the Energy Department’s accelerated cleanup initiative,
environmentalists last week released internal DOE documents raising major
questions about “clean closure” plans that will leave small, residual amounts
of high-level radioactive waste in underground storage tanks at the Idaho
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory.
The documents, now under review by
state and federal regulators, could undermine a DOE plan to close two
300,000-gallon underground storage tanks in place after removal of most of
their contents--highly radioactive liquids and solids left over from past
nuclear weapons production at the lab, known as INEEL.
The tank closure project—the first
of its kind at INEEL—was approved by Idaho regulators April 18. But that was
before the internal DOE documents were leaked by an INEEL employee to the
Environmental Defense Institute, a local watchdog group.
Chuck Broscious, executive director
of the institute, forwarded the documents to state and federal officials,
calling for an investigation into whether DOE has been upfront with regulators
about potential problems with the INEEL tank closure plan.
INEEL officials had no comment
Friday nor did state officials.
The questions raised in the leaked
DOE documents also could affect tank closure efforts under way at the department’s
Savannah River Site in South Carolina and Hanford site in Washington. As at
INEEL, DOE wants to close those tanks in place—rather than dig them up and
remove them—as a way to save money and reduce exposure to cleanup workers. At
all sites, the department has contended residual wastes left on the bottom of
the tanks—known as “tank heels”--would pose little threat of leakage because
wastes would be stabilized and total contaminant levels would be limited.
However, some regulators and citizen
watchdog groups say DOE has not shown the stabilized wastes will be safe. And
the Natural Resources Defense Council has filed suit challenging DOE’s legal
right to leave any high-level radioactive waste at DOE sites, saying such waste
must be placed in more leak-resistant underground disposal repositories.
The INEEL documents released by the
Environmental Defense Institute could add to concerns that DOE’s closure plans
might leave significant contamination in tanks without effective containment
measures.
In the documents—which date back to
1998 and 1999--DOE technical experts at INEEL acknowledge that the planned
“minimalist approach to waste removal” may not clean out the tanks sufficiently
to meet DOE requirements for disposal of plutonium and other transuranic (TRU)
wastes.
“[S]trict adherence to the
requirements for TRU waste disposal (e.g., compliance with [DOE regulation] 40
CFR 191) may be impractical in the
context of high-level waste facility closure,” said an expert identified as Vic
Jacobson. “It would be more appropriate to consider the tank heels as waste
(although it contains [more than 100 nanocuries per gram] of alpha-emitting
transuranic isotopes) that may be approved for disposal on a case-by-case basis
in accordance with [other DOE regulations].”
Further, the INEEL experts openly
challenge assertions that residual wastes left in the bottom of the tanks can
be effectively stabilized through mixing with cement-like grout—a concept DOE
wants to pursue at several nuclear weapons sites with underground radioactive
waste storage tanks.
DOE officials have maintained that
grout pumped into the tanks will combine with the tank heels, even where solid
residual wastes are actually stuck to the bottom of the tank. The department
says this will form a highly durable cement mass that will resist leaching of
contaminants into soil and groundwater for many decades.
However, the INEEL experts are
quoted in the documents as saying the grout is unlikely to mix with the waste
left in the tank, but rather will harden on top of it—providing no dilution or
stabilization of the waste.
“The grout will not encase the
solids; they will sandwich them between
the grout and the bottom of the tank,” one expert, David Ostby, said in the
documents, which were written as part of internal DOE review of the tank
closure plan.
Ostby suggested that “sandwich”
might not provide the kind of waste containment needed. He noted the
1950s-vintage underground waste tanks sat on a bed of porous sand inside a huge
concrete vault that was known to leak.
Underneath the tank is sand,” he
said. “Under the sand is the tank vault. The vault has been proven to leak from
the infiltration of rain water.”
Another expert, Cliff Olsen,
expressed doubt that DOE could show that residual waste left in the tank was
“Class C” waste—a form of low-level waste. Rather, the expert suggested the
department would have to take advantage of a regulatory loophole that would
allow DOE to make the case that residual waste left in the tank would not
result in dangerous leakage at INEEL.
Specifically, Olsen noted that if
Class C limits for key radionuclides could not be met, then DOE could avail
itself of “alternative classification criteria based on a site specific
performance analysis."
He added, with a touch of humor: “A ray of hope; a way through the maze! This
looks like our only way out, at least based on our minimalist approach for
waste removal and cleaning. We should make a play for this approach.”
Other issues raised by the documents
include:
1.)
DOE directives to remove any references in documents to possible
“unknown leaks” from the tanks. “Delete
"unknow (sic) leaks"-- it adds nothing to item and raises lots of
questions if we say we have unknown leaks,” said one document.
2.) DOE efforts to remove references
to “high-level waste” for fear it would increase state cleanup demands. Several
documents emphasize that the department must stick to its “official position”
that the tanks do not contain “high-level waste,” but rather sodium-bearing
waste. The problem, said one document, was that state regulators might be able
to demand removal of anything deemed high-level waste under current legal
agreements.
3.)The likelihood that efforts to
wash out tanks with water might not work with some solid wastes. “This clean/wash/rinse
activity will have little or no effect on the chemical composition of the
solids since they are insoluble even in
2-3 molar nitric acid,” said one document. “This activity may or may not
physically move the solids inside the tank or remove them from the tank.”
4.) DOE reluctance to discuss toxic
chemical constituents in tanks, saying it would only “confuse” tank closure
efforts and that those chemicals would be dealt with under other regulatory
proceedings.
5.) Warnings not to promise removal
of fission products to concentrations below levels found in high-level waste.
One document said that could complicate plans at Savannah River to dispose of
cesium in grout burial grounds.
6.) The failure of some tanks to
meet earthquake resistance standards.